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Abstract

Title:

An Investigation of Runway Risks Using a Systems Approach

Author:

Mehnaz Hassan

Major Advisor: Ulreen O. Jones-McKinney, Ph.D.

The purpose of this study was to explore and determine if Causal Analysis Based
on System Theory (CAST) could divulge differing underlying causes in the Taxiway
overflight incident of Air Canada Flight 759 at San Francisco International Airport, as
compared to traditional investigation methods used by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB). Investigations tend to focus on trying to establish the probable cause of
an accident or incident, and as a result, the systemic components tend to be overlooked
which leads to the common underlying causes of the event left unsolved. Adopting a
systems approach to assessing runway risks helped identify flaws in the aviation system
and generated viable recommendations for fortifying a system and mitigating the risks
mitigated. The CAST analysis generated a range of different underlying causes to the
incident and identified factors related to runway risks. CAST determined organizational
failure in procedures and policies to be the underlying cause of the Taxiway overflight

incident of flight AC759. The identified factors related to runway risks included:
misleadingly configured airfield lighting, a lack of automation, landing parallel to a
taxiway, and improper application of Crew Resource Management.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Problem Statement
Runway risks are an increasing concern in aviation, due to the major potential for
detrimental harm to lives as well as aviation assets. This risk has been observed in the
rising number of runway incursions as monitored by the FAA. The FAA has found that
on average, three runway incursions occur every day at towered airports. As such, in
2018, 1,832 incursions were reported in the United States. Consequently, the FAA has
deemed the mitigation of Wrong Surface Events like runway incursions as one of its
primary priorities (Jackman, 2019).
While most investigations are focused on trying to establish probable cause of the
accident or incident, the systemic components tend to be overlooked which leads to the
common underlying causes of the event left unsolved. Moreover, focusing on a probable
cause basically focuses on establishing blame. Concentrating on blame obstructs and
hampers what we can learn from incidents and accidents (Leveson, 2019). This was
observed in the investigation of the United Airlines flight 266 (UA 266) accident that
occurred on January 18th, 1969 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020-A).
Shortly following departure at night from Los Angeles, the crew of UA 266
recorded a fire alert in Engine 1, thereby they shut down engine one which resulted in
loss of Generator 1. Following this, Generator 2 also failed, resulting in a complete loss
in the generation of electrical power, and since the backup electrical system also gave
way the aircraft ultimately had no power with non-operative instruments. The aircraft
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made impact in terrain in Santa Monica Bay, and the NTSB ruled the probable cause as
crew disorientation in a departure which was affected by incapacitated instrument
displays owing to the loss of electric power. Although they established the probable
cause, they failed to determine why all power generators failed and why the backup
electrical system also consequently failed (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020-A).
Failure to determine the systemic components in the accident left the underlying causes
unknown and unresolved. The misidentification and in-evaluation of these underlying
causes allows for a recurrence of the accident in the future.

1.2 Purpose Statement
Jackman (2019) stated wrong surface events occur on average twice a week at
airports located in the United States. The National Air Traffic Controllers Association
(2019) stated that a total of 557 wrong-surface approaches occurred from fiscal year 2016
to 2018. Though 85% of wrong surface events comprise general aviation aircraft, it does
not discount the fact that commercial aircraft are not exempt from these risks. Indeed,
“wrong surface events involving commercial aircraft are the highest risk and detrimental
events in the National Airspace System” (Jackman, 2019).
Evidently, this is observed in the Air Canada Flight 759 incident that took place
on July 7, 2017. The A320 aircraft was on approach to San Francisco International
Airport prior to midnight, when it aligned with the occupied taxiway instead of the
parallel Runway 28R, which it was instructed to land on. The taxiway was occupied by
four aircraft holding short for departure, when the Air Canada aircraft flew over the first
jet at 100 feet above ground level (AGL) and then commenced a go-around just as it flew
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over the second aircraft at 60 feet AGL. The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) ruled the probable cause of the incident as the flight crew’s “misidentification of
Taxiway C as the intended landing runway, which resulted from the crew’s lack of
awareness of the parallel runway closure due to the ineffective review of NOTAM before
the flight and during the approach briefing” (Jackman, 2019).
In order to enhance safety and mitigate runway risks such as wrong surface events
successfully, a systems approach may be adopted in favor of acquiring as much
information as possible from each accident in order to adapt initiatives that would help to
alleviate further loss. Since the NTSB faulted the flight crew’s errors as the cause of this
serious incident, the purpose of this research was to explore if Causal Analysis Based on
System Theory (CAST) would reveal different or other underlying causes in the Taxiway
Overflight Air Canada Flight 759 incident at San Francisco, California.

1.3 Definition of Terms
1. Causal Analysis Based on Systems Theory (CAST) – is an accident analysis tool,
which is based on systems theory. It integrates engineering analysis causal
components which are increasing in risk due to systems becoming more and more
complex (Leveson, 2019).
2. Causal Model – a quantitative depiction that tries to interpret and describe causal
relationships in a system by incorporating multiple variables (Causal Modelling,
2020).
3. Cognitive Dissonance- when a new behavior or task conflicts with a long-held
doctrine or belief, individuals experience mental discomfort and the only solution
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to alleviate this mental discomfort is for the individuals to change their beliefs and
actions (Festinger, 1962).
4. Confirmation Bias- when individual only seek, hear for, or acknowledge data that
confirms their own preconceptions. They tend to not look out for or be attentive to
information that could disconfirm their perception or belief (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2020-G, p.11).
5. Expectation Bias- when individuals hold a strong belief or mindset with regards to
something they expect to see or hear, and they act based on those beliefs (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2020-G, p.11).
6. Instrument Landing Systems (ILS)- provides precision approach to a runway, by
using two radio beams that give horizontal and vertical guidance during an
approach for landing (Instrument Landing Systems (ILS), N.D).
7. Organizational Influence – pertains to organizational decisions of higher-level
management, which directly impacts supervisory methods and operator actions
and circumstances (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000).
8. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts - the physical and mental conditions of the
workforce that contribute to latent failures. This includes weak coordination,
communication, fatigue (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000).
9. Runway Excursion – a veer off or an overrun that takes place when an aircraft
deviates to the runway end, or to the side of it, in an attempt to take off (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2020-D).
10. Runway Incursions – are any events at an airport related to aircraft, vehicles,
individuals or objects on the ground that form a hazard for collision or produce a
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loss of separation with an aircraft which is landing or taking off, or with the
intention to take off or land (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020-B).
11. Safety Control Structure- For the purpose of this study, a safety control structure
is defined as follows: a hierarchical structure, where multiple control layers,
components and entities interact to deliver safe operations in a given industrial or
organization system.
12. Situational Awareness – is the perception of factors in a given environment within
a given period of time and the understanding of their implications and estimation
of their output in the future (Situational Awareness, 2019).
13. Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) – is an accident
causation model that assimilates engineering investigation causal components into
accident investigation (Leveson, 2017).
14. Wrong Surface Events – occur when an airplane lands or takeoff, or attempts to
land or takeoff, on the wrong runway or on a taxiway and at a wrong airport
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2020-C).

1.4 Research Questions
The primary research questions that guided this study was: Does a systems
approach to hazardous events involving runway incursions generate different contributing
factors or causes as compared with traditional investigation methods?
Following an emergent study design, three secondary research questions were
posed:
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1. Can CAST be used to identify factors which are related to runway risks?
2. What new things can be learned using CAST?
3. Can CAST reveal different underlying causes?

1.5 Significance of the Study
The proposed research question was significant because, while most
investigations are focused on trying to establish the probable cause of the accident or
incident, the systemic components tend to be overlooked that can lead to the common
underlying causes of the event being left unsolved. Taking a systems approach to
assessing runway risks helps identify flaws in the system in order to make viable
recommendations for how a system can be fortified and the risks mitigated. This study
added a systems approach perspective of knowledge to the traditional methodology of
assessing risks, and identified the constraints and controls that need alteration and
inclusion into the design of the pertinent systems. Systems theory provides regulatory
authorities to consider new recommendations and take the necessary industry-wide
actions to mitigate runway risks.

1.6 Study Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations can be any situation or incident that occurs beyond the researchers’
control and confines the findings of the study from being generalized. Delimitations are
the restrictions or the situations that the researchers enforce on the study, which further
restrict the findings of the study from being generalized. These limitations and
delimitations are also addressed in Chapter 5, Discussion.
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1.6.1 Limitations
The limitations of this study were as follows:
1. Event. The research was limited to the Air Canada Flight 759 incident which
took place on July 7, 2017 at San Francisco International Airport. Archival
data, retrieved to inform the study, was limited to what was available from the
sources, such as accident reports and accident data dockets. The persons and
organizations involved in the event were not available for interviews.
1.6.2 Delimitations
The delimitations of this study are as follows:
1. Analysis Approach. The methodology chosen for this investigation was
Causal Analysis Based on Systems Theory (CAST). I used Dr. Levesons’
CAST handbook to guide me through the CAST process. The CAST process
focused on studying the controls and constraints in place in the safety
structure of the organization. It took on a systems approach of assessing their
weaknesses and absent controls in the system, whereby it did not assign
blame, but instead it addressed the issue as a design flaw in a machine with an
engineering perspective.
2. Analysis Tools. The information docket released by the NTSB on the Air
Canada Flight 759 incident was the primary source of knowledge and
information in investigation the wrong surface event.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter contains a review of theory and literature that sheds light on
knowledge related to the field of study. It begins with a review of theories that unpin the
mechanics behind all of the different constructs related to this study. In particular, the
review of underlying theory addresses causality models, and how these models are used
to determine accident causation. The next section covers a review of underlying literature
related to runway incursions and excursions, and the application of systems theory. The
last section of this chapter summarizes the findings of the literature review and the
implications for this research study.

2.2 Review of Related Theory
This study utilized systems theory and CAST as the basis for the methodology
and case study analysis. However, an essential part of the results of the study was a
comparative analysis with traditional methods for determining accident causation.
Therefore, the review of related theory also included more traditional causality models.
Accident and incident investigation reports often refer these theories and models and
warrant further review.
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2.2.1 Accident Causation Models
2.2.1.1 Swiss Cheese Model
James Reason developed the Swiss Cheese Model in 1990, as an
instrument for determining accident causation (James Reason HF Model, 2016).
Advanced technology systems tend to have copious amounts of defense overlays
as a means of preserving systems and individuals from any potential hazards.
These layers of defense include engineered mechanisms, human factors-based
shields, as well as, procedural and regulatory controls. Ideally, these lines of
defense are fail-safe with no room for gaps or shortfalls that could prove
hazardous or fatal. However, the reality is that each of these layers of defense tend
to have at least one or more deficiencies. James Reason constructed a model
depicted by Swiss cheese where each of the slices of Swiss cheese represent a line
of defense or control, and like Swiss cheese, each of these layers have holes in
them, which represents the deficiencies or weaknesses in each line of defense
(Reason, 2002). On an individual basis, the holes in each of these defenses do not
generally account for any loss or hazardous outcome; however, when multiple
holes in the defense layers align on a unique occasion this allows a proclivity of
an accident event to occur. In this instance, a hazard has the opportunity to pass
through these aligned holes in defense and results in an accident as shown in
Figure 2.1 (James Reason HF Model, 2016).
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Figure 2.1
Swiss Cheese Model of how defenses, barriers and safety layers are penetrated
during an accident.

Source: HF Model (Reason, 2002).

Reason has proposed that the majority of such events relate to one or four
pedigrees of deterioration, which include organizational influence, unsafe
oversight, preconditions for hazardous actions, and unsafe actions (James Reason
HF Model, 2016). The holes in the lines of defense appear due to active failures
and latent conditions, which generally exist in amalgamation with each other in
all afflicted events. Active failures have been defined as the unsafe actions done
by those individuals who have immediate connection to the system, which
emerges as mistakes or violation of protocols. Latent conditions are referred to the
faulty designs of a particular system, which include judgements made on designs,
10

regulations and decisions made by higher level managers. Latent conditions like
these have two types of adverse impacts which include an error conducive
environment which then concurrently can cause enduring deficiencies in the
system. These conditions tend to exist passively in the system for a long time
before being galvanized by an active failure and a hazardous trigger to set the
scene for an accident to occur. Reason (2002) theorizes that latent conditions have
the potential to be recognized and repaired prior to the occurrence of any
unfavorable events. This evaluation and detection of latent conditions allows us to
take a proactive initiative to risk management instead of a reactive one. Moreover,
Reason believes that the key to rectifying these unsavory components is by fixing
the latent conditions beforehand in order to stop active failures from occurring
(Reason, 2002).
Bergeon and Hensley (2009) chronicle a different predictive risk
mitigation model and it is assessed on the basis of the Swiss Cheese Model. The
Predictive Risk Mitigation Analysis (PRiMA) has been constructed to aid
common risk appraisals, management and reduction procedures as a means of
averting operation based incidents and minimize its repercussions in the event
they take place. PRiMA has been designed to identify vulnerabilities in current
layers which will help to establish possible new layers to be added and establish
resolution steps to be taken and in what sequence they must be established. The
Swiss Cheese Model theorizes that a single layer of safety will never be perfect
and as such, a system should plug the vulnerabilities in the layers and add as
many layers as feasible (Bergeon, Hensley, 2009).
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2.2.1.2 Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes
Dr. Nancy Leveson at Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed
system Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) in 2012 aimed at
engineering more reliable systems. This accident causation model assimilates
engineering investigation causal components into accident investigation, which
are becoming alarmingly dangerous in the highly complex systems which operate
today. These engineering components include software, man-based decisionmaking, human factors, advanced technology, social and organizational
structures, as well as safety culture. Although this approach is quite novel, it is
being implemented in a variety of industries including space, medicine,
automotive, nuclear, aviation, space and many more (Reykjavik University,
2020).
The STAMP model comprises three constituent parts, which are safety
constraints, hierarchical safety control structures, and process models combined
with basic systems theory. STAMP examines systems as interlinked components
maintained in conditions of dynamic symmetry due to feedback control loops.
Therefore, systems are treated as dynamic mechanisms that are constantly
acclimating to accomplish their goals and to respond to adjustments within
themselves and their surroundings, and as such are not evaluated as fixed
structures (Leveson, 2017).
Safety is a result of the system that is attained when the correct constraints
are established on the correspondence and performance of the system. The design
has to invoke suitable constraints on interactions as a means to maintain
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operational safety and it must also invoke suitable constraints according to the
alterations that occur in the design of the system over time. As such, accidents are
the products of deficient procedures concerning human interactions,
organizational frameworks, engineering actions as well as physical structures
which served to infringe the safety constraints of the system. STAMP analyzes
the events leading to an accident as an adjustable feedback operation that was
unsuccessful in assuring safety according to the alterations of systems
performances taking place over time in order to achieve intricate objectives.
Moreover, STAMP also takes the perspective that constituent failures can be
alleviated by enhancing the solidity of the constituents with reference to internal
and external factors or by constructing within safety margins or factors (Leveson,
2017).
The STAMP model shifts its approach of accident investigation from
preventing failures to recognizing and administering controls on the behavior of
systems and interaction methods. STAMP perceives and analyses accidents or
losses with the understanding they took place due to an inefficient administration
of controls on safety in the system. Complex systems for instance, are generally
managed by active controls built to identify, gauge, decipher and react to
hazardous circumstances. The more recent controls consist of technology to
regulate the results and responses produced (Stukus, 2017).
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2.2.1.3 Causal Analysis Based on Systems Theory
Causal Analysis Based on System Theory (CAST) is an accident analysis
approach based on intrinsic engineering theories. Majority of accident
investigations begin with the perspective that the operator error is the reason for
accidents as well as incidents. The aim of CAST is to study and collect as much
information as possible and analyze it as well as possible. Notably, the CAST
investigative process enables analysts to recognize what questions have to be
asked and answered, as well as what data needs to be collected in order to build a
comprehensive description regarding why the specified loss arose and to aid the
making of recommendations about how to prevent potential accidents like it
(Leveson, 2019).
CAST consists of a five-part process. The first step or component is to gather
basic data on the accident, this includes outlining the system and the perimeters of
the assessment, defining the loss which occurred and the hazardous state which
contributed to it. It also includes recognizing the safety constraints which have to
be put on the system in order to avert hazards, outlining what happened in the
events without making judgements and form questions regarding the sequence of
events. Moreover, it includes assessing physical loss with regards to the
equipment and controls in place, the obligations on the physical model, their
controls, failures, risky actions, absent controls and any contextual influences
which were required to inhibit the accident and other cases like it. The aim of the
remaining analysis of the first step is to classify the limitations of the given safety
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control system which enabled the loss and determining how to fortify it for future
purposes (Leveson, 2019).
The second component of CAST is to create a model of a safety control
structure whilst the third step is to assess the loss in each constituent and establish
why the components of control were ineffective in inhibiting the loss. The third
step is conducted by beginning the examination at the bottom of the control
system, demonstrating what purpose each component has in the accident and
clarification of why they behaved how they did which also includes determining
why they believed it was the correct course of action. The fourth component
determines the flaws in the control system as a whole entity which led to the
accident. The fifth and final step is to build an improvement program whereby
recommendations are made for making alterations to the control system in order
to inhibit related similar losses in the future (Leveson, 2019).
Each of these components are concerned with forming questions which
have to be answered in the future when more data is gathered. The role of these
questions is to enable investigators to identify what else has to be learned in order
to be able to give an extensive explanation as to why the event happened. The aim
of CAST is to satisfactorily answer all questions or to deem them as not
answerable. The answers will give explanations about the “why’s” of the loss
(Leveson, 2019). Alternative theories such as Situational Awareness, Safety
Culture, and Cognitive Dissonance Theory can further support and expound on
the understanding of the circumstances and components involved in runway risks.
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2.2.1.4 Situational Awareness
For the purposes of this research, situational awareness is defined as the
perception of factors in a given environment within a given period of time, and
the understanding of their implications and estimation of their output in the future.
Situational awareness means acknowledging and valuing the processes and states
that occur around you in a given environment. In complex environments, which
include aircraft operations, situation awareness is related to the professional’s
knowledge of specific task-based events. An air traffic controller for instance has
to be aware of the aircraft location, flight plan and estimating upcoming states in
order to identify any potential conflicts which may arise. As such, situational
awareness with regards to operations means knowledge of the present state and
the dynamics in a system whereby the individual can foresee alterations in the
future (Situational Awareness, 2019).
Situational awareness involves being aware of what is happening in your
surroundings and making assessments in order to recognize and minimize any
potential risks. This analytical-reasoning concept is utilized in heavy data-based
areas like air traffic control and is recognized as an essential component in highdependability establishments (Rodriguez, 2017). The term has a history of
different definitions, most of which are in contrast to each other (Dominguez,
1994). The problem arises in the fact that in the dynamic environment of aviation
the importance of information and the occurring events is contingent on each
individual context. As such, they will differ from each unique circumstance
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(Woods, 1986). Situational awareness is defined in Chapter 1 for the purpose of
this study.
2.2.1.5 Safety Culture
Safety Culture is a dynamic structure of influences at different levels
which influence the efficiency of safety performance. The idea of safety culture
revolves around the value an organization places upon safety and how important it
is to them (Salas, 2010). It is concerned with the level of commitment the top
management in the organization has towards safety, as such, safety culture has to
be integrated with the day-to-day practices and business plan of the organization.
Safety culture is comprised of two parts: components and dynamics (Salas, 2010).
Components are the four elements which unitedly define safety culture, this
includes: values, attitudes, leadership strategies and performance. Dynamics is
used to describe the interactions among these elements which results in the
prevailing condition of the culture. The interactions described occur among
individuals, the collective, and the corporation that nurtures latent issues
contributing to either a failure in the system or the resilience to make up for any
errors and inhibit them from producing a failure. High Reliability Organizations
(HROs) such as aviation firms and nuclear plants have been regarded as a high
benchmark for safety performance due to their safety culture. The success of their
performance has been attributed to their capability to acclimate as a means to
maintaining systemic safety by adapting to hazardous factors (Salas, 2010).
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Figure 2.2
The Safety Culture Pyramid

Source: Human Factors in Aviation (Salas, 2010).
The four components of a safety culture is depicted in the outline of a
pyramid as shown in Figure 2.2, whereby the base represents the fundamental
safety values, the next level encompasses the safety initiative strategies, followed
up by the attitudes and notions of the organization and the safety performances
which tops off the pyramid (Salas, 2010). Safety values are concerned with the
integration of safety concerns in the day-to-day practices and business plan of the
organization, usually demonstrated by a statement of values. Safety leadership
strategies are concerned with the policies, protocols, mission, staff evaluations
techniques, penalty and reward procedures and leadership procedures of the
organization. Safety climate is concerned with the attitudes towards safety that
gauges the perceptions, responses and opinions about the prescribed safety
policies, which is concerned with individual and collective impressions and
18

notion of the comprehensive safety at the institution. Safety performance is the
overall results of the discernable behaviors related to safety like safety
enhancements due to hazard reports (Salas, 2010).
These dynamic configurations of each of the factors in the pyramid
produces four apparent predominant states of safety culture, these include;
secretive, blame, reporting and just culture. In a secretive culture, staff tend to
conceal their mistakes or tamper with performance information as a means to
conceal errors. Blame culture leads to the miscommunication, if any, of problems
in the system and latent failures. In order to rectify this conundrum, a large
number of organizations are aiming towards achieving a just culture. In a just
culture, the environment prompts a level of trust whereby individuals are
advocated and rewarded for communicating critical safety-based data, and there is
a clear distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. A just culture
operates on the basis that as culpable professionals, employees are supposed to
conduct themselves in accordance with fundamental ethical and professional
standards. If a mistake is committed, then there will be no punitive repercussions
for it, instead if the actions infringes on the established actions, then it will be
categorized as an intentional disregard for safety, for which there may be
disciplinary repercussions (Salas, 2010).
2.2.1.5 Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Festinger’s (1962) cognitive dissonance theory expounds that when a new
behavior or task conflicts with a long-held doctrine or belief, individuals
experience mental discomfort and the only solution to alleviate this mental
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discomfort is for the individuals to change their beliefs and actions. Piaget (1977)
dubbed this mental state of discomfort as a state of disequilibrium, whereby he
believed that the only way to return to a mental state of equilibrium is by a mental
process known as accommodation. Accommodation enables individuals to expand
their knowledge of existing conditions by reconciling them with any new
information or belief which they have been presented with. In the case of pilots,
they attempt to maintain a level of familiarity in any given circumstance, and try
to alleviate any potential for a state of unfamiliarity. In context of this study,
cognitive dissonance would require the pilots to make accommodations in
contrast to their long held beliefs for landing procedures and instructions.

2.3 Review of Underlying Literature
2.3.1 Runway Hazards and Risks
There is a dearth of literature about wrong surface events such as the Air Canada
FL 759 incident, however, other related runway hazards and risks have been studied.
These hazards and risks include runway incursions and excursions.
2.3.1.1 Runway Incursions
The FAA has established the definition of a runway incursion as any event
at an airport related to aircraft, vehicles, individuals or objects on the ground
which forms a hazard for collision or produces a loss of separation with an aircraft
which is landing or taking off, or with the intention to take off or land (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2020-B). Loss of separation refers to an aircraft and
other objects involved being nearer than prescribed by air traffic control. The
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FAA has classified that when an aircraft gets within a range of one mile of
landing but is compelled to abort because of a vehicle, pedestrian or aircraft on
the runway, itis categorized as a runway incursion. A minor version of this is
referred to as a surface incident, where an infringement of Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs) occurs, but it does not cause a hazard for collision or loss of
separation (Thomas, 2002).
The FAA has concluded that a majority of runway incursions occur due to
human error instead of equipment failure. It is also crucial to note that the FAA
has limited the classification of runway incursions to airports that have control
towers only, when in reality only a limited portion of airports in the United States
have operating control towers. This could be due to the potential devastation
which could occur at larger airports with airline services, which could be why the
FAA focuses its information gathering efforts at airports with control towers since
they present a greater risk to the public. Concurrently, the FAA has segregated the
sources of runway incursions into the following major classifications: Pilot
Deviations, Operational Errors, and Vehicle Pedestrian Deviations (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2020-E).
Thomas (2002) stated that, though the FAA had implemented its first
runway safety enhancement plan in 1991, in the ten years since the article was
published, no conclusive enhancement has taken place. It was also determined
that the biggest shortfall of the runway safety initiative was the consistent
ineptitude of correct data on runway incursions and that every inspection of the
FAA’s endeavors has yielded minimum enhancements. Thomas (2002) stated that
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accurate data is necessary in order to gain a better understanding of runway
incursions, as such the FAA best option was to enhance data gathering and
analysis techniques at airports with control towers, which would then allow them
to quantify the problem at airports without control towers. Thomas (2002)
stressed that congress should focus on offering substantial funds and professional
expertise as means to addressing the incursions which arise due to mechanical and
human error in order to mitigate safety risks (Thomas, 2002).
Wang (2018) conducted a systematic literature review that was utilized to
incorporate the results of past studies on runway incursions in a systematic
method, identify causal influences on runway incursions and offer an
understanding on the root causes of runway incursions. One hundred and thirty
four past articles were selected, of which 22 were assessed after they were filtered
based on a set criteria. This analysis produced six classifications of contributing
influenced to runway incursions, which include: human influences, airport
geometry, technical influences, airport features, environmental influences, and
organizational influences (Wang, 2018).
Wang (2018) concluded that human influences and airfield geometry are
the major influencing factors impacting runway incursions which was determined
using quantitative and qualitative research. Airport features, technical influences,
organizational, and environmental influences also impact runway incursions in
that order. This study also developed a set number of recommendations with
regards to each factor. For human factors, conducting initial and recurrent training
for pilots as well as air traffic controllers and ground operators. The training
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would be aimed at focusing on causes of runway incursions including pilot
deviations, vehicle and pedestrian deviations, and operational incidents. It is also
critical to include the development of organizational influences which back
systemic techniques for human factors. This identifies the significance of
solutions which focus on both human and organizational influences which would
impact human factors. The report concluded on the note that it is important to
systematically analyze and investigate the research which has been done on
contributing influences to runway incursions in order to mitigate runway
incursion events (Wang,2018).
2.3.1.2 Runway Excursions
The Federal Aviation Administration (2020-D) adopted the International
Civil Aviation Organization definition of a runway excursion, whereby an
excursion is a veer off or an over run which takes place when an aircraft deviates
to the runway end or to the side of it in an attempt to take off. When an aircraft
deviates off to the side of a runway, it is classified as a veer off, and when an
aircraft deviates off beyond the end of a runway, it is classified as an overrun.
This definition excludes events where an aircraft did not land on a runway and
when the aircraft departure sequence did not begin on a runway (Distefano, 2019).
Distefano (2019) conducted a research aimed at identifying the interaction
between the differing aspects of operating conditions which take place in runway
excursions. In order to establish the correspondence among characteristic aspects
of runway excursions, the research used multiple correspondence analysis (MCA)
as the methodology. MCA is utilized to depict and model information sets as
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“clouds” of points in multi-dimensional Euclidean space. MCA uses five
variables, which include: geographical area, probable cause, class of aircraft,
nature of the flight and damages to the aircraft. This research limited the dataset
to only runway excursions that occurred from 2006 to 2016. The dataset analyzed
excluded events which occurred at the time of takeoff from t hose which took
place during landing (Distefano, 2019).
Distefano (2019) revealed that one of the major consequences of runway
excursions was significant damage to aircraft and it seldom lead to complete
destruction of the aircraft. Another finding revealed that the generally prevailing
cause of runway excursions was aircraft system faults during take-off rolls that
lead to minor physical damage to the aircraft. However, during landing
procedures, weather conditions was the prevailing cause of excursions, which
inversely caused significantly more damage to aircraft. Additionally, for large
aircraft the most pertinent cause of runway excursions during take-off was due to
weather conditions, while during landing procedures, the most pertinent cause
was aircraft system failure (Distefano, 2019).
Distefano (2019) stated that for corporate aircraft, the state of runway
conditions such as wet conditions was the common cause for excursions for both
takeoff and landing procedures. Moreover, in the event that an aircraft was
completely destroyed during an excursion, the common cause was due to
detrimental weather conditions during both takeoff and landing procedures.
Distefano’s (2019) research concluded on the note that multiple correspondence
analysis is a viable method to pull pertinent knowledge from runway excursion
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accident information. These findings will help aviation safety experts in
identifying the hidden risk association class of factors in runway excursions
(Distefano, 2019).
Chang (2016) conducted a study to assess the risks of human factors
linked with pilots during runway excursions, by implementing the SHELLO
model to classify the human risk factors and analyze the significance of it
according to the expert opinion of 145 air carrier pilots. These air carrier pilots
believed that the most significant risk factors include wet/containment runways,
weather dilemmas such as thunderstorms, and environment. The SHELLO model
-modified by Chang - added the human-organization component to the traditional
SHELL Model and is coined as the SHELLO Model. The original SHELL model
is a theoretical instrument that is utilized to investigate components of multiple
systems (ICAO SHELL Model, N.D.). SHELL is an acronym for Software,
Hardware, Environment and Liveware as a means to dignify human influence
components. The SHELLO model used in this research incorporates
pilot/liveware. The SHELLO model consists of: Pilot’s core ability which is the
Liveware, Interaction with other staff which is Liveware-Software, Pilot and
Organization which represents Liveware-hardware, Pilot and Environment which
represents Liveware-Environment, Pilot and Software which represents Livewareliveware and Pilot and Hardware which represents Liveware-Organization
(Chang, 2016).
The research used a pairwise comparison technique known as the analytic
hierarchy process (AHP), which is an efficient instrument for computing
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complicated decision-making issues. It is a concept of measurement using
pairwise compatibility and it banks on the judgements of professional experts to
run the scale of priority. It uses a ratio scale of one to nine as a means to compare
two benchmarks for illustrating the strength of corresponding significance. AHP
consists of three steps: forming the pairwise comparison matrix, computing the
Eigen values and Eigen vectors as well as the relative significance weights and
evaluating the consistency of the ratios produced (Chang, 2016).
Chang (2016) found that the most prominent human risk components are
present in the liveware sector, which implies that a pilots’ base capabilities are a
prominent contributing influence to accidents in runway excursions. Therefore,
pilot training and safety promotions have been recommended as a prime method
of mitigating runway excursions, with the addition of enhanced safety attitude and
situational awareness in the initial and continuing training. The researchers also
found that environmental factors pose as the next prominent contributing factor in
runway excursions. The study proposed improved runway infrastructure
characteristics such as runway pavement, length, and approach lighting systems to
alleviate runway incursions. As a supporting mechanism, the researchers
recommended government and airport organizations should concentrate their
endeavors and resources to enhance airfield safety. The study created a roadmap
for initiatives on reducing runway excursions with risk components tiered
according to ranks of significance and achievability (Chang, 2016).
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2.4 Systems Approach Applications
A crucial consideration of systems approach is understanding that STAMP is a
proactive approach, where a system is analyzed before an accident or loss, while CAST is
a reactive approach, whereby the system is analyzed after the fact (Leveson, 2019).
2.4.1 CAST Applications
Stukus (2017) conducted a STAMP analysis on a U.S. coast guard buoy tender
integrated control system. The navigational control system for the ship had the burden of
not only fortifying the safety of missions, but also to re-establish confidence in the
control system. An accident analysis was carried out on specific events using techniques
based on STAMP. A comparative analysis conducted using Root Cause Failure Analysis
(RCFA) and CAST, which were then compared. The findings showed that RCFA and
CAST had some minor similarities in their results, however, the higher control system
was entirely overlooked in the RCFA process. This implies that CAST offers a more
comprehensive analysis and recommendations for system enhancement, by way of
improving control systems and related procedures, whereas is more attuned to isolated
constituents and mid-level system losses (Stukus, 2017). Moreover, techniques based on
STAMP were used to conduct a hazard analysis on the system, which produced several
unique requirements in design which could be applied to upgrades on the system in the
future. The investigation also revealed that CAST can help to provide a directory of
requirements production for potential upgrades and maintain cognition of other
requirements, in this case, this applies to the WLB ISCS of the system (Stukus, 2017).
Düzgün, Leveson (2018) conducted a CAST analysis on the Soma mine disaster
in Turkey. The Soma mine disaster of 2014 took place because of a fire, which resulted in
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301 casualties. The CAST analysis in this study concentrated on scrutinizing the
sociotechnical system structure so as not to point fingers at a single entity or person to
blame for the disaster. By taking on this approach, each degree in the structure was
analyzed to understand how much each level contributed to the overall failure of the
system. This allowed the analysts to incorporate the findings from the accident in order to
include these considerations into the designing process of an enhanced safety system for
institutional, social, physical and legislative entities. The researchers classified the
analysis of the disaster into the identification of system hazards, safety constraints,
existing hierarchical control structure and structural dynamics involved, which are the
initial steps taken in the CAST analysis. Following this, recommendations were made for
the safety control system of underground coal mines in Turkey (Düzgün, Leveson, 2018).
The results of the analysis found that CAST helped to identify the reasons for
outcomes and dynamic nature of the disaster which led to the accident. It found that the
regulatory habitat for the promotion of the mining industry lacked a requirement of safety
standards which accounts for a level of acceptable high risk in each level of mining. Due
to the evolving political climate in the nation, societal controls like labor unions lost their
main function and as such, the social and regulatory structure allowed mining firms to
take on low financial risk operations such as hazardous mine structure with large
numbers of workers. Since this analysis took on five proposed hypotheses of different
experts, STAMP with CAST proved to be highly competent in dealing with ambiguities
and as such, CAST proved to be very robust in the process of identifying vulnerabilities
in safety constraints. This allowed for the recognition of required safety improvements in
the mining industry in Turkey by providing a systematic technique for fortifying the
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safety system as a means to preventing disasters like this in the future. The
recommendations produced systematic and measurable enhancements to the safety
control structure, which indicated the value of STAMP with CAST and its tenacity
(Düzgün, Leveson, 2018).
Li et al. (2020) conducted a CAST analysis on an underground pipeline gas
explosion which took place in Taiwan. This study used CAST to build the safety control
structure that was then examined on a hierarchical basis. The analysis revealed the
inadequacy of the existing controls, the safety constraints which were infringed upon, and
the in-depth reasoning regarding the decisions which were made leading to the explosion.
The researchers made recommendations with regards to the changes which should be
made at each hierarchical level. Since CAST is robust enough to assess and evaluate
complex socio technical disasters like this, the study also concluded that the safety
control structure only has to be modeled once. The model can then be built upon further
in correspondence with the changes implemented over time, which would expedite the
analysis of accident causes. Moreover, it was concluded that the model could be used to
configure a safer system during the development process as a means of alleviating
accidents. Ultimately, it was found that CAST is also a flexible tool for promoting
continuous enhancements to the controls of the safety system, which as a result, allows
for constituting a robust safety scheme for underground gas pipelines (Li et al., 2020).
2.4.2 STAMP Applications
Allison et al. (2017) conducted a study using STAMP and its predictive
evaluation matrix, Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). STPA was used to
understand the response and decisions a flight crew makes during an aircraft rapid
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decompression event. To conduct this study, STAMP-STPA was used in three workshops
in which the critical safety components were recognized and analyzed. After identifying
the potential hazards, STPA followed a three-step approach, the first step was building a
high degree hierarchical control system, the second step involved the identification of
unsafe control actions, and the third step involved assessing the causes behind the unsafe
control actions by building feedback loops for the unsafe control actions. The first
workshop was aimed at establishing accurate scenarios for STAMP and to gain
perspective on linked hazards. The second workshop was aimed at building the high
degree of control structure and to identify unsafe control actions. The third workshop
worked on continuing the process of identifying unsafe control actions and also to
generate a high standard control loop with the help of the unsafe control actions. The
results showed that STAMP-STPA was capable of recognizing influencing elements
linked to the Helios 522 accident. The study inferred that STAMP-STPA is useful to
produce a wide range of intuitions with regards to critical safety data, and it is able to do
so in a method which takes into account individuals, organizations and technology in a
manner which does not place blame on one entity (Allison et al., 2017).
Rong, Tian (2014) used STAMP on human rationality analysis (HRA) by
proposing a different technique with emphasis on human error causality in the realm of a
sociotechnical system, as a means to demonstrate the reasoning behind it, as well as, its
feasibility in the event involving the Minuteman III Missile Mishap, which occurred on
May 23, 2008. This study used STAMP to create a universally accepted structure of
human error causal analysis. The study also used systems dynamic modeling as a means
of demonstrating the dynamics of human error and causal relationships in the system. The
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study used a causal loop diagram (CLD) and the stock and flow diagram (SFD) to
demonstrate the interacting components of the system. As such, a formal framework was
developed to carry out a human rationality analysis on the accident, which had six
components. The STAMP application produced 41 influencing components which were
then classified into four categories of human error. Each of these influencing factors are
linked to the bigger picture of sociotechnical structures and provide a better
understanding behind the factors contributing to the accident. This produced an array of
recommendations with applications to technical and management enhancements that
would have decreased the likeliness of the accident (Rong & Tian, 2014).
Chatzimichailidou et al. (2017) used a Bow-tie analysis and STAMP as a basis of
comparison of results on the deduction of risk of surgical instrument retention. Each
analysis was conducted independently after which, the results of each were contrasted
and amalgamated. The two analysis techniques were used to aid in the minimization of
retention risk because even though it is rare, retaining surgical instruments after
performing a Central Venous Catheterization (CVC) in a patient poses a considerable
risk. Three of the members of the project then proceeded to set up the Bow-tie analysis
that was reviewed by four experts in medicine. The STAMP began with numerous
conferences utilizing doctors as a means of collecting information that was used to
conduct the analysis (Chatzimichailidou et al., 2017).
The study found that both Bow-tie and STAMP analyses generated advantageous
outcomes that would build on current knowledge, and using them in combination proved
to be quite beneficial. The Bow-tie analysis provided a broad picture of what tasks keep
controls running and who is in charge of in task, while STAMP showed the safety
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constraints that were not reinforced by the accountable individual of the controlled
protocols. The study concluded that Bow-tie analyses and Systems Theoretic Process
Analysis (STPA) work well together. Bow-tie analysis provided an illustration of the
areas analysts should focus on and since STPA involves a long process, the Bow-tie
analysis diagram could help analysts to save time and focus on the areas that require
attention. The Bow-tie diagram therefore has an auxiliary role in support of STPA, which
proves that using a diverse set of analysis techniques with an integrated approach which
accounts for end-user inputs would be highly competent in the pursuit to mitigating the
risk of guidewire retention which is a medical instrument (Chatzimichailidou et al.,
2017).
Kim et al. (2016) used STAMP analysis to evaluate the accident of the Korean
Sewol Ferry in 2014. The accident involving the capsizing of the Sewol Korean
passenger ship was used in this analysis to establish the eligibility of STAMP to maritime
event analysis. The main goal of this study was to focus on establishing the reasons
behind why the accident took place and what can be done to inhibit accidents like this in
the future. In order to accomplish this, the sequence behind the assessment performed
was altered in correspondence with the proximate accident being established prior to
conducting the analysis. After the proximate sequence of events were established, a
hazard identification and control structure establishment was carried out, following which
the analysts built an accident causation model. This led to the assessment of the physical
system along with crew analysis, ship-owning firm analysis, the classification society,
regulatory authorities and related industry associates till finally the recommendations
were proposed (Kim et al., 2016).
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The study established that the safety control structure of the incorrectly designed
ships along with the disproportionate level of responsibility led to an unacceptable level
of hazardous conditions. STAMP successfully determined the direct and indirect
contributing factors that were linked with the accident which were not previously
identified in other accident analysis techniques. While STAMP clearly presented a more
holistic, all rounded systematic method which revealed the reasoning behind the
decisions made, the study also noted the fact that a comprehensive and in depth analysis
using CAST needs a large volume of information linked with the entire system as whole,
and therefore it might be problematic to access certain resources. Additionally the
recommendations produced from CAST may have issues to be implemented in a timely
manner (Kim et al., 2016).
2.5 Summary and Study Implications
The articles reviewed in this chapter have revealed some key characteristics about
CAST and the systems method behind it, STAMP. CAST can help to provide a directory
of requirements production for potential upgrades whilst maintaining cognition of other
requirements (Leveson, 2019). In one analysis, CAST took on five proposed hypotheses
of different experts, STAMP with CAST proved to be highly competent in dealing with
ambiguities and as such, CAST proved to be very robust in the process of identifying
vulnerabilities in safety constraints.
Since CAST is robust enough to assess and evaluate complex socio-technical
disasters, the safety control structure only has to be modeled once and it can then be built
upon in correspondence with the changes implemented with time, which would expedite
the analysis of accident causes. Moreover, it was also concluded that the model could be
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used to configure a safer system during the development process as a means of alleviating
accidents. Ultimately, it was found that CAST is also a flexible tool for promoting
continuous enhancements to the controls of the safety system, which as a result allows for
constituting a robust safety scheme for a wide range of industries.
STAMP-STPA is useful to produce a wide range of intuitions with regards to
critical safety data, and it is able to do so in a method which takes into account
individuals, organizations and technology in a manner which does not put blame onto one
entity (Leveson,2019). While STAMP clearly presents a more holistic, all rounded
systematic method which reveals the reasoning behind the decisions made, it is also
important to note that a comprehensive and in depth analysis using CAST needs a large
volume of information linked with the entire system as whole, and therefore it might be
problematic to access certain resources.
My study was different from these analyses because CAST is typically applied to
an accident which has occurred, however my study applied CAST not to an accident, but
to a runway incursion incident which could have resulted in the worst airfield accident
since the Tenerife accident in 1977.
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Chapter 3
CAST Methodology
CAST was used to analyze one single event of a runway incursion, the Taxiway
Overflight Air Canada Flight 759 incident at San Francisco, California. All information
regarding the Air Canada Flight 759 incident was gathered, mainly through the Docket
released by the National Transportation Safety Board (National Transportation Safety
Board, 2018-A). The analysis followed the steps prescribed in the CAST Handbook
(Leveson, 2019).
The research was conducted as a qualitative case study analysis because it enabled
exploration of the incident using a range of data sources. This qualitative approach
enabled numerous facets of the event to be exposed and understood. A case study
analysis was appropriate because, although the event revolves around the decision
making of the frontline operators who were pilots, it had to be considered within context
of the entire aviation system and the different entities and departments in play. The
research conducted in this case study was exploratory as the systems and controls being
evaluated had no single outcomes.

3.1 Population and Sample
The targeted population in this research study was all wrong surface accidents and
incidents at airports in the U.S. and the accessible population were incidents subject to
the NTSB investigation method. The sample consisted of one event analyzed in the form
of a case study of the Taxiway Overflight Air Canada Flight 759 incident. This incident
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was chosen because the preliminary analysis of the incident report produced by the
NTSB revealed some unexplained discrepancies that were not fully investigated.
3.2 Study Implementation Procedures
The case study analysis relied on information acquired through data collection
from secondary sources. The main source of information for the study were archival
banks such as the NTSB Docket from which data was retrieved. Other Secondary sources
of information included Air Canada’s Submission to the National Transportation Safety
Board in the Investigation of the Overflight of a Taxiway at San Francisco International
Airport on July 7, 2017 and the NTSB incident investigation report. For the purpose of
this research, the five universal steps of CAST, depicted in Figure 3.1, were broken down
into eight components to facilitate the analyses. The CAST analysis was used to identify
systemic shortcomings which contributed to the incident. Once systemic shortcomings
were identified, they were used to generate recommendations based on the findings of the
analysis. Finally, the findings of the analysis was used to conduct a comparison with the
findings and results of the NTSB investigation.
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Figure 3.1
CAST Process

Source: CAST Handbook (Leveson, 2019).

Component 1 – Gather information and identify the different systems involved in
the event, as well as, the hazards were identified.
Component 2 – Determine the safety constraints corresponding to every hazard
and the requirements of the system requirements which are linked to them.
Component 3 – Model and chronicle the safety control systems that are currently
in place to regulate the hazards and impose the safety constraints.
Component 4 – Establish the sequences of events and actions leading to the
mishap.
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Component 5 – Examine the loss that occurred at the physical level. This
encompasses two parts, which are:
a. Determine the degree of contribution of physical controls, operational
controls, dysfunction in interactions, pitfalls in coordination and
communication, physical failure, and unaddressed disruptions.
b. Establish the reason behind the inadequacy of the physical controls which
led to the event.
Component 6 – Investigate how and why the higher level of the safety control
structure contributed to the incident.
Component 7 – Establish the dynamics and any alterations in the system and
safety control systems that contributed to the mishap.
Component 8 - Produce recommendations that will inhibit unsafe actions and
factors in the system.
3.2 CAST Analysis
The study analyzed each of the components in the safety control structure in
CAST diagrams developed for the Air Canada 759 flight (AC759) incident. The
researcher raised questions throughout the analyses in order to identify gaps in the overall
system control structures. This allowed the investigation to identify shortcomings of the
controls in the system that were unable to prevent the AC759 incident from occurring.
3.2.1

Component 1 – Systems and Hazards
The aviation industry is a complex system of authorities, regulations, facilities,

service and product providers and personnel working together to ensure efficient and safe
operations of commercial air travel. The systems involved in the AC759 incident include
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the aircraft and its Flight Management Systems (FMS), the Air Traffic control (ATC)
tower on the airfield and its tracking technologies, San Francisco International Airport
(SFO) and its protocols (quiet flying), Transport Canada, Air Canada, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the personnel operating and controlling the landing
procedures. The personnel include the captain, first officer and flight dispatcher of the
AC759 aircraft, and the Controller-in-Charge (CIC) at the ATC tower. All of these
systems were in charge of governing and ensuring safe operation of aircraft flight,
including departure and arrival procedures.
As a result of the AC759 case study analysis, the following four hazards were
identified as being associated with these systems:
•

Hazard 1 – Loss of Situational Awareness (H1-LSA). There was a loss of
situational awareness on the part of the pilots.

•

Hazard 2 – Loss of Aircraft Separation (H2-LAS). There was a loss of separation
between AC759 and other aircraft on the airfield at the time of the incident.

•

Hazard 3 – Incorrect Approach Procedures (H3-IAP). There was incorrect
application of final approach procedures that constituted a procedural failure.

•

Hazard 4 – Ineffective Monitoring of Systems (H4-IMS). There was ineffective
monitoring of navigational equipment, and surveillance systems for the airspace
and airfield.

3.2.2

Component 2 – Safety Constraints and System Requirements
The CAST analysis identified safety constraints put in place to prevent the four

hazards identified above. Consistent with the CAST methodology, corresponding
questions were posed to investigate and build an understanding as to why these safety
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constraints were not effective or violated. Table 3.1 summarizes the four hazards, safety
constraints, and associated questions for ease of reference. It should be noted that the
answers to the emerging questions were answered through the case study process, and are
provided in later components of the CAST analysis

Table 3.1
Hazards, Safety Constraints, and Associated Questions
Hazard

Safety Constraints

Condition

Questions
Q1A, Q1B &

H1-LSA

Ineffective
FMS, CRM, & Communication with ATC

H2-LAS

EGPWC, ASSC

Q1C
Ineffective

Q2A & Q2B
Q3A, Q3B &

H3-IAP

Violated
FMS, Auto-Pilot/Auto-tuning of ILS Frequencies

H4-IMS

FAA ATC Staffing Rules

Q3C
Ineffective

Q4A

Note. Questions Q1A through Q4A are posited in the main text body of this section.

H1-LSA Safety Constraints – Pilots’ situational awareness is bolstered by
use of the FMS, Crew Resource Management (CRM) and coordination with ATC.
Procedures and CRM would dictate that the captain of AC759 verifies the ILS
frequency inputted by the first officer, and this did not happen. As such, safety
constraints for H1-LSA were ineffective in the AC759 incident posing to the
following three questions:
•

Question 1A (QIA). Why did the captain of AC759 not check to confirm
the ILS frequency for the Bridge Visual Approach had been correctly
tuned?
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•

Question 1B (QIB). Why did the captain not communicate with the first
officer about the status of the navigational equipment?

•

Question 1C (Q1C). Why did ATC not communicate with the flight crew
of AC759 about their misaligned approach to Runway 28R?
H2-LAS Safety Constraints – AC759 separation with other aircraft on the

airfield could have been protected by the use of Enhanced Ground Proximity and
Warning Systems (EGPWS) and Airport Surface Surveillance Capabilities
(ASSC). These systems are discussed further in Component 5 of the CAST
analysis. The safety constraints for H2-LAS were ineffective in the AC759
incident posing to the following questions:
•

Question 2A (Q2A). Why did the various surface detection systems not
alert the controller and the flight crew of the hazardous location of the
AC759 aircraft?

•

Question 2B (Q2B). Why did the aircraft system not give alerts of
altitude?
H3-IAP Safety Constraints – The FMS and auto-pilot features of AC759

aircraft allowed for auto-tuning of the ILS frequencies except for this incidence
using a FMS Bridge Visual Approach to Runway 28R. There was incorrect
application of final approach procedures resulting in procedural failure to
manually tune the ILS frequency. This lead to the alignment of AC759 flight path
with the parallel Taxiway C as opposed to Runway 28R, and eventually to the
loss of separation with other aircraft on the airfield. Safety constraints for H3-IAP
were violated in the AC759 incident posing to the following questions:
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•

Question 3A (Q3A). Why was there no back up system to avert hazards
related to manual tuning of ILS frequencies?

•

Question 3B (Q3B). Why were Runway 28L’s construction signs not
visible to pilots on the approach to Runway 28R?

•

Question 3C (Q3C). Was the location of the Precision Approach Path
indicator (PAPI) for Runway 28R a factor in the misaligned approach?
H4-IMS Safety Constraints – There was ineffective monitoring of

navigational equipment, the airspace, and airfield. FAA staffing rules indicate that
two air traffic controllers must be present at all times at the control tower.
However, only one controller was present in the tower at the time of the incident
because the second controller had taken a break from duties. Safety constraints for
H4-IMS were ineffective, that is oversight of FAA staffing rules, during the
AC759 incident posing to the following questions:
•

Question 4A (Q4A). Why were FAA staffing rules ineffective at the time
of AC759 incident?

3.2.3

Component 3 – Safety Control Structures
The safety control structure of the industry was segregated into three separate

control structures in order to simplify and understand how the three main control systems
influenced and impacted the actions and events related to the AC759 incident. The CAST
analysis identified these three safety control structures as: Air Traffic Control (ATC),
Airline, and Airport.
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3.2.3.1 ATC Safety Control Structure
The ATC Safety Control Structure addresses aircraft facilities at greater
length than the other two structures, because the FAA issues advisories and air
traffic controllers issue instructions based on FAA set priorities and protocols.
The ATC control structure includes greater detail about aircraft facilities such as
auto-pilot and visual approach, because the pilots are meant to take action on the
aircraft controls based on the instructions of ATC. As depicted in Figure 3.2 this
control structure is closely linked to the events involving the AC759 incident
because ATC and the flight crew were responsible for coordinating safe landing
procedures for the aircraft.
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Figure 3.2
Air Traffic Control Safety Control Structure

Notes. a) This diagram was modeled and built as part of the CAST analysis by the researcher.
b) For the purpose of simplicity, AUTO PILOT has only been included in ATC structure.
c) Dotted lines with arrows indicate that only information is provided.
d) Solid lines with arrows indicate that a direct control is being administered.
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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The FAA is in charge of
upholding the safety of civil aviation in the United States. Their role in the
industry encompasses the standardization of civil aviation with the aim of
promoting safety and the development and fostering of new technology in civil
aviation and aeronautics. As such, they are responsible for operating the air traffic
control system, navigation of civil and military flight operations, and the
regulation of commercial space transportation in the United States. This
responsibility also includes the development and enhancement of air traffic
control systems and the navigational requirements of civil and military flight
operations. The FAA is also in charge of routine research and development tasks
for the National Airspace System (NAS), as well as, civil aeronautics (FAA,
2016).
FAA operations span a range of activities; however, for the purpose of this
case study three main activities were focused on, these include: safety regulation,
airspace and air traffic management, and air navigation facilities. The FAA issues,
disseminates and maintains the enforcement of safety regulations and minimum
standards with regards to aircraft manufacturing, operations and maintenance.
This includes the certification of airmen airports which serves commercial airlines
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2016).
In the context of airspace and air traffic management, the FAA operates a
vast grid of airport towers, flight service stations and air route traffic control
centers. The FAA controls air traffic, makes air traffic regulations and designates
airspace use. In the vicinity of air navigation facilities, the FAA constructs and
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implements visual and electronic assistance facilities for air navigation, whereby
they operate, maintain and ensure the integrity and efficacy of these facilities.
Moreover, they also maintain alternative complementary systems which aid air
traffic control and navigation, these systems include radar equipment, voice and
data communications facilities, computer systems and visual display equipment
for flight service stations (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016). As such, the
FAA provides the Notices to Airmen (NOTAM), approves bridge visual approach
charts, and designs ILS as depicted in Figure 3.2 above.
Air Traffic Control. The primary objective of the Air Traffic Control
system is the prevention of aircraft collisions, whereby the controllers issue
instructions and clearances for taxiing, takeoff and landing procedures on the
basis of their observations and data received from supporting facilities. These
facilities encompass the national weather service, flight service stations, aircraft
flight crew, ATC enroute centers and alternative sources. First priority is given to
ensuring safe aircraft separation and issuing radar safety alerts (FAA, 2020). As
such their role in the system involves transferring control and receiving control of
aircraft with instrument flight approaches to and from neighboring facilities when
aircraft exit or enter their airspace. Air Traffic Control also administers safe
separation control between aircraft landing and departure activities. Moreover,
controllers have to swiftly remember aircraft registration numbers that are in their
control, along with the type of aircraft, its speed, location in the airspace and also
the location of navigational aids situated in the vicinity (Airport Traffic Control
Tower Position Description, 2020).
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Furthermore, the Air Traffic Control system plays a crucial role in aiding
national security and homeland defense. In the event that an aircraft position is
unsafe with reference to obstacles such as terrain and other aircraft, issuing a
safety alert is the first priority of ATC. The controller is required to keep issuing
alerts until the pilot of the aircraft responds that they are taking action to resolve
the unsafe position of the aircraft. This identification of the unsafe condition is
contingent upon the air traffic controller’s observation and recognition of the
hazard (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010).
Pilots. The pilot-in-command (PIC) is responsible and is therefore the
final authority to ensure safe operation of the aircraft. Generally, in a two-pilot
effort, one is assigned to be the Pilot Flying (PF) while the other is assigned to be
the Pilot Monitoring (PM). Their first priority is controlling the aircraft flight
path. The main role and responsibility of the PF is to manage the flight path,
therefore they always must be actively engaged in flying the aircraft, and this
applies even when auto-pilot control is engaged. This requires the PF to abstain
from any tasks which would distract the PF from actively flying the aircraft. In
the event that the PF needs to take on activities that divide his or her attention, the
PF should handover control of the aircraft to the second pilot and take over the
PM post. The main role and responsibility of the PM is to always monitor the
energy levels of the aircraft and the current and projected flight path. The PM
must be informed of all Air Traffic Control clearances, instructions and aircraft
status, thereby supporting the PF around the clock. This duty includes observing
the aircraft and system statuses, voicing any deviations from the planned flight
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path which the PM may perceive and anticipate, and if the situation calls for it,
intervene where required (FAA, 2015). As such, if an emergency situation arises
whereby instant action is necessary, the PIC has the authority to deviate from any
precedent in the General Subpart A and Flight Rules Subpart B under with Title
14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 91.3 (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2020-F).
A320 Auto-Pilot. The auto-pilot system of the Airbus A320 series is a part
of the Flight Management System (FMS). As depicted in Figure 3.3, the FMS
comprises two Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) and two Flight
Management Guidance Computers (FMGCs). The flight management offers
performance optimization, display management and navigation, whilst the flight
guidance offer commands for auto-pilot, flight director, and thrust controls. Flight
augmentation computes flight envelope calculations, yaw damping, and turn
coordination (Airbus, 2017).

Figure 3.3
Flight Management System
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Pilots use six control components to communicate and interact with the
auto-pilot system: the Flight Control Unit (FCU), Sidesticks, Thrust Levers,
Primary flight display (PFD), Navigation Display (ND) and the Multifunctional
Control and Displays Units (MCDUs). Pilots interact with the FCU using four
knobs, which provide corresponding controls for airspeed, navigation modes or
heading, vertical speed and climb or descent modes. The MCDU is the main
interface between the FMS and pilots, while the sidestick controllers allow Pilots
to navigate the aircraft manually and any strong pressure on them deactivates the
auto-pilot (Airbus, 2017).
Lateral guidance modes maintain the course of the aircraft to its
destination. Once the Pilot activates the heading mode, a digital display on the
FCU will display the layout of the heading, whilst the heading is depicted on the
FMA (Airbus, 2017).
3.2.3.2 Airport Safety Control Structure
The Airport Safety Control Structure, depicted in Figureure 3.4, addresses
the airport facilities in place during the AC759 incident such as airfield lighting,
runways, and Instrument Landing Systems (ILS). These physical facilities provide
the visual and electronic guidance required for flight crew to assimilate data
effectively and execute a safe approach to arrival.
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Figure 3.4
Airport Safety Control Structure

Notes. a) This diagram was modeled and built as part of the CAST analysis by the researcher.
b) For the purpose of simplicity, AUTO PILOT has only been included in ATC structure.
c) Dotted lines with arrows indicate that only information is provided.
d) Solid lines with arrows indicate that a direct control is being administered.
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Airport. When San Francisco International Airport (SFO) was inaugurated
on June 6, 1927, the airport was known as Mills Field Municipal Airport of San
Francisco. The 150 acre hosted 19 aircraft with a 4,590 foot runway. In 1930, the
property expanded by 1,112 acres and was renamed to San Francisco Airport in
1931. After the airport hit its two million passenger point in 1952, a new central
terminal was built and inaugurated in 1954 in order to accommodate the
increasing passenger traffic. In 1959, the first commercial jet operations were
launched at SFO by Trans World Airlines. The jet age propelled SFO into
becoming the fourth busiest airport in the country by 1962, following which, a
new south terminal was inaugurated in 1963. As such, the jet age helped the
airport reach its ten million passenger point in 1966. Following airline
deregulation in 1978, the existing air carriers increased their routes while new air
carriers entered the industry (Payne, N.D) Today, SFO is a busy hub airport
providing commercial air service to community.
FAA. The FAA operates a vast number of air traffic control towers around
the U.S. in order to provide navigational instructions and facilities for aircraft at
or around airports, the same applies for SFO. The FAA is responsible for the
development and mitigation control of aircraft noise and alternative
environmental impacts due to civil aviation activity (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2016). In order to mitigate the noise pollution of aircraft to
neighboring residential communities, FAA approved SFO’s “Fly Quiet Program”
during nighttime operations.
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Air Traffic Control Tower. SFO and the FAA inaugurated a new,
ecofriendly ATC tower in October 2016. The construction of the tower was
completed in 2015 and it can withstand an earthquake of 8.0 magnitude on the
Richter scale. The new Air Traffic Control Tower provides a 235-degree view of
unobstructed line of sight to the runways and taxiways. The Air Traffic Control
Tower is situated between Terminals 1 and Terminal 2, with a 44,000 square-foot
center at the base. It houses administrative bureaus, computer infrastructure
including back-up generators, and a protected area for travelers to pass through
without entrance to the tower. The Air Traffic Control Tower also incorporates
state of the art equipment such as a ground radar system as well as touch-screen
visual displays that keep the controllers informed of the weather and status of the
airfield. Additionally, the ground radar systems are connected to runway status
lights (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016-B).
Airport Maintenance. The Airport Maintenance at SFO was in charge of
inspecting and overseeing the condition of the airport’s airfield facilities,
including runway lighting at the time of the AC759 incident. SFO has four asphalt
runways, Runway 10L/28R, Runway 10R/28L, Runway 1R/19L and Runway
1L/19R as depicted in Figureure 3.5 . All runways on the field are equipped with
high intensity runway edge lights (HIRL). At the time of the AC759 incident,
Runway 10R/28L was unlit because it was closed for construction.
Runways. The runway facilities at SFO during the time of the AC759
incident are the same as present day. Runway 10L/28R was 11,870 feet long and
Runway 10R/28L was 11,381 feet long. Both Runways 10L/28R and 10R/28L
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were equipped with white centerline lights, precision markings, and a four light
PAPI to the left on both runway ends. Runway 10L was equipped with runway
end identifier lights (REIL) and a touchdown point that is not lighted. Runway
28R was equipped with a 2,400 foot, high intensity approach lighting system,
with white centerline sequenced flashing lights (ALSF-2) and a lighted
touchdown point. Runway 10R has a touch down point that is not lighted.
Runway 28L has a lighted touch down point and is equipped with a 1,400 foot
medium intensity approach lights system including runway alignment indicator
light (MALSR). ILS and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) instrument
approaches were provided for both Runways 10L/28R and 10R/28L (KSFO-San
Francisco International Airport, 2021)
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Figure 3.5
SFO Runways

Source: Federal Aviation Administration, N.D.

Runway 1R/19L was 8,650 feet long and had white centerline lights.
Runway 1R had a touchdown point that was not lighted and was equipped with
REIL. Runway 19L was equipped with a four light PAPI to the left, a lighted
touch down point, and a 1,400 foot medium intensity approach lights system with
sequenced flashers (MALSF). ILS and DME instrument approaches were
provided to Runway 1R/19L (KSFO-San Francisco International Airport, 2021).
Runway 1L/19R was 7,650 feet long and had white centerline lights and
non-precision markings. Runway 1L had a touchdown point that was not lighted
and was equipped with runway end identifier lights (REIL). Runway 19R had a
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touchdown point that was not lighted and was equipped with a four light PAPI to
the left of the runway centerline (KSFO-San Francisco International Airport,
2021).
Taxiway C. Taxiway C was 12,330 feet long and 75 feet wide and was
equipped with green centerline lights placed at 50 foot intervals and blue taxiway
edge lights placed at the intersection with Runway 28R. An airport development
plan of SFO had concluded that Taxiway C did not fulfill the FAA design
standard of a runway centerline to taxiway centerline separation of 550 feet with
Runway 10L-28R. This area of non-conformance is depicted in Figure 3.6.
Instrument Landing System (ILS). Generally, an ILS provides precision
approach to a runway, by using two radio beams that give horizontal and vertical
guidance during an approach for landing. The localizer (LOC) gives horizontal
guidance to the runway centerline and the glideslope (GS) gives vertical guidance
to the touchdown point of the runway. Approach lighting systems guide the flight
crew to switch over from instrument to visual approach. The LOC antenna is
situated on the extended centerline of an ILS runway and is placed far enough
from the opposite side of the runway to avert any likely collision. The ILS emits
signals for a field pattern which creates a course guidance for aircraft to follow on
the descent down to the runway centerline towards the middle markers (MM) as
well as outer markers (OM). The guidance from the LOC is transmitted on radio
frequencies from 108.1 to 111.95 MHz from a distance of 18 nautical miles (NM)
starting at the runway threshold and an altitude of 4,500 feet over the antenna
(Instrument Landing Systems, N.D).
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Figure 3.6
SFO Airport Layout Plan

Source: SFO 2014 Airport Layout Plan (Ricondo &Associates Inc, 2015)

The GS equipment is placed in a building about 750 to 1,250 feet down
from the runway and is 400 to 600 feet from the runway centerline to its one side.
The approach on the ILS takes place in two parts, the first is the radio guided
approach and the second is the visually guided approach for verification of
accuracy and safety. The visual stage is guided with approach lighting systems
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(ALS) that offer lighted guidance on distance, direction and glide path data for the
transition into the visual approach (Instrument Landing Systems(ILS), N.D).
The ILS is also prone to certain disadvantages and limitations since the
LOC and GS are prone to interference. The GS antenna for instance, reflects an
image of the signal it emits off the surface at the front of the antenna to make a
mirror image of the signal. The surface snow can throw off the signal it emits.
Likewise, if a vehicle drives through the LOC beam, it can throw off the
horizontal guidance it provides. As a result, the ILS has limitations on reflection
and false course guidance. Vehicles on the ground and aircraft in flight below
5,000 feet above ground level (AGL) can disturb the signal for an aircraft on
approach. For false course guidance, the GS equipment also emits guidance for
courses at higher or steeper vertical guidance. If an aircraft flies the course at a
constant altitude, the flight crew would observe gyrations of the GS needle and
warning flags as it goes through false courses. In order to steer clear of the false
course guidance, the flight crew would have to conduct the approach at the
specified altitude on the correct approach chart (Instrument Landing Systems,
N.D).
FMS Bridge Visual Approach. SFO conducts a ‘Fly Quiet Program’ for
flight operations that occur late in the night and early morning. The purpose of the
Fly Quiet Program is to reduce noise pollution to neighboring residential areas.
SFO requires and instructs for Quiet approach using Bridge visual approach
during nighttime operations as it is quieter than ILS, and can be used only for
Runway 28R. These precautions put emphasis on the need for flight crews to
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maintain flight to the right side of Runway 28L and not infringe on the adjacent
approach airspace as there is 750 feet between centerlines (SFO community
Roundtable, 2016).
Pilots. Pilots have to follow the advisories of airports. In this case, SFO’s
Fly Quiet Program encourages pilots to fly bridge visual approaches in order to
reduce noise pollution to neighboring residential communities. Pilots also receive
visual and electronic guidance from the runway lighting and navigational systems
provided on the airfield to assist them when navigating to the airport.
NOTAM. SFO issued a NOTAM on the day of the AC759 incident
concerning the closure of Runway 28L. Component 6 of the CAST analysis
provides the details of this NOTAM.
3.2.3.3 Airline Safety Control Structure
The Airline Safety Control Structure, depicted in Figure 3.7, addresses the
civil aviation authority, namely Transport Canada, and Air Canada’s policies that
govern and instruct the procedures by which the flight crew must conduct
themselves. Moreover, the CAST analysis addressed the airline’s decision to
equip their aircraft with automated systems and features or not, their runway
database, and the navigational systems they chose to install. These airline choices
dictated the automation capabilities of the aircraft, and ultimately the workload of
the AC759 flight crew.
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Figure 3.7
Airline Safety Control Structure

Notes. a) This diagram was modeled and built as part of the CAST analysis by the researcher.
b) For the purpose of simplicity, AUTO PILOT has only been included in ATC structure.
c) Dotted lines with arrows indicate that only information is provided.
d) Solid lines with arrows indicate that a direct control is being administered.
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Transport Canada. The regulating authority for Air Canada is Transport
Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) also referred to as Transport Canada. In Canada,
TCCA holds responsibility for the advancement and promotion of safety in all
areas of civil aviation. In order to promote civil aviation safety, their regulatory
framework engages TCCA in the development of policies, regulations, guidance,
standards and educational content. Their oversight tasks encompass the
verification of industry compliances with the regulatory framework, and
accomplished by the provision of certifications, inspections, assessments,
validation and enforcement (Transport Canada, 2019).
Air Canada. Air Canada places high priority on safety within and outside
its organizational structure and as such has its own Safety Management System
(SMS), which is approved and in compliance with the Canadian Aviation
Regulations (CAR). The President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the
designated accountable authority for Air Canada’s SMS, and their Senior
Director, corporate safety and environment and quality have the responsibility of
implementing the SMS policies and processes on the CEOs’ behalf. In 2012, Air
Canada inaugurated the Safety Information Management System (SIMS),
whereby a single consolidated reporting system allows employees to file
electronic reports through Air Canada’s intranet portal with ease. Integrated safety
teams process and assess these employee reports are then processed and tailor
adequate operational enhancements (Air Canada, 2012).

60

Air Canada’s approach to safety involves the understanding and belief that
accidents are an organizational occurrence. As a result, their SMS assimilates and
consolidates operational and technical systems with human resource management
and financial management, in turn underpinned and enhanced by a human factors
framework. This framework grants the knowledge that most accidents and
incidents occur due to human error. However, the framework goes beyond this by
focusing on the underlying causal factors involved. These causal factors
encompass and consider organizational and work environment conditions that
may have system deficiencies and undetected hazards (Air Canada, 2012). Air
Canada also participates in the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), which is
an internationally renowned safety audit tailored to examine the operational
management and control systems of air carriers. This allows them to foster a
culture of continuous enhancement for the overall safety level (Air Canada,
2012).
Pilots. Section 3.2.6.1 Analysis of Responsible Actors provided details of
AC759 pilots’ responsibilities, which Component 6 – Investigation of Safety
Systems also addresses.
Dispatch. Flight Dispatchers are the secret ingredient of an airline’s
operation who ensure that each flight plan is sound, and aircraft fly the routes
safely and legally. These individuals have specialized licenses that make them
experts in flight planning and tracking. Their responsibilities include creating
flight plans, calculating fuel loads, following pertinent regulations, monitoring
weather, winds, and other conditions that may affect the flight, communicating
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with the flight crew to keep them up-to-date with any changing conditions, and
maintaining operational control (Vakhrushev, 2019).
Operational control is a term usually associated with the PIC of the
aircraft, but in actuality, the dispatcher has the authority to delay and cancel
flights and they have the responsibility to divert an aircraft to its alternate
destination if weather conditions deteriorate at the original destination. The
dispatcher is responsible for monitoring the weather and notifying the flight crew
so they can prepare to divert to their alternate. The dispatcher will work with the
crew to get them things they need, such as an airport’s NOTAMs and their
projected fuel burn (Vakhrushev, 2019). A single flight is a joint operation
between both the flight crew and the dispatcher who must all work together to
ensure each flight is legal and safe. Dispatchers are expected to follow each of
their flights and update the flight crew with changing information (Vakhrushev,
2019).
Aircraft. The safety and automated flight capabilities of AC759 was
contingent on the database and the aircraft systems provided by Air Canada. The
FMS Bridge Visual Approach for Runway 28R was the singular approach that Air
Canada’s database did not have in its database. Moreover, systems such as
EGPWS have facilitating features such as the Runway Awareness and Advisory
System (RAAS) and Smart Landing. However, AC759 along with all other A320200s in Air Canada’s fleet were not equipped with RAAS or Smart Landing. The
absence of these features could have contributed to the lack of situational
awareness of the flight crew about their approach path. An aircraft and flight
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crew’s capabilities and workload would be contingent on technical aspects such
as the absence of RAAS and Smart Landing. The CAST analysis discussed the
roles of RAAS and Smart Landing in the assessment of physical controls (see
Component 5).
3.2.4

Component 4 – AC759 Incident Sequence of Events
Figure 3.8. outlines the sequence of events leading up to the AC759 incident on

July 7, 2017. According to the NTSB (2018), Air Canada’s dispatch did not schedule
captain for any flights; however, he was on reserve as a PIC. At 11:49 hours, Air
Canada’s dispatch called him for duty on AC759 bound for SFO. When the captain
reported for duty at 19:40 hours, he had been awake for almost twelve hours, with only
four to six hours of sleep the night prior. The first officer also got about six hours of sleep
the night before the flight, and a 60 to 90 minute nap during the afternoon. The flight
crews’ sleep cycle is a necessary consideration in the CAST analysis because it affected
their circadian rhythm. The circadian rhythm depicts an individual's expected
wakefulness and sleep cycle over a 24-hour period. When individuals are awake during a
circadian low period, they experience increased levels of fatigue, including side effects
such as decreased perceptibility, shortcomings in focus and forgetfulness (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A).
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Figure 3.8
Step by Step Sequence of the Events Leading to Incident

Note. This diagram was built by the researcher as part of the CAST analysis.
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AC Flight 759 departed at 21:58 hours after a delay of over half an hour. In the
NOTAM data sheet the flight crew received at the beginning of the flight, a critical
update was included and stated that from 23:00 hours to 08:00 hours the next morning
Runway 28L would be closed for construction. The NOTAM was at the bottom of the
chart and not easily distinguishable from other notices. NTSB (2018) stated the first
officer could not recall seeing this update. The captain saw the NOTAM; however, he
was not sure if there would be a delay and as such expected their arrival to be before the
runway closure time. Another message was sent to the AC759 flight crew about the
closure of Runway 28L via the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS)
information Quebec which displayed the NOTAM, but neither crew could recall whether
they saw it or not (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A).
SFO ATC instructed the flight crew to conduct the “quiet” FMS Bridge Visual
Approach, depicted in Figure 3.9, which was a noise abatement flight procedure steering
clear of neighboring residential areas. This visual approach was to be flown manually
from the San Mateo Bridge to Runway 28R threshold. However, the approach chart
indicated that flight crew must tune the navigational equipment to the ILS frequency for
Runway 28R to align with the runway centerline. This was the only approach that had to
be tuned manually to the correct ILS frequency on the aircraft. The first officer missed
this step, and the captain and first officer did not check to see that the correct frequency
appeared on the display, which they were supposed to do (National Transportation Safety
Board, 2018-A).
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Figure 3.9
Bridge Visual Approach Chart used by AC759 Crew

Source: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB , 2018-B, p.18)
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As shown in Figure 3.9, when the flight reached the San Mateo Bridge in San
Francisco, the flight crew switched to visual approach from the autopilot as per the
procedures. The first officer was also supposed to manually tune the ILS to frequency
111.7 when they reached the San Mateo Bridge, after which they would have to perform
a sidestep which would have aligned the aircraft with Runway 28R. However, the first
officer did not tune the ILS.
As per Air Canada’s policy, the pilots discussed any potential encounterable
threats to the approach (NTSB, 2018). This included proximate mountains, visibility in
night conditions, as well as their own fatigue; however, they did not mention the closure
of Runway 28L. Runway 28L was set to have its lights switched off, with the exception
of a large white “X” closed runway sign flashing at the threshold of the runway along
with lights from construction vehicles as per regulations. The unlit Runway 28L led to
confusion for the Delta flight 521 (DL521) flight crew that landed before AC759. DL521
crew perceived Runway 28R as Runway 28L and parallel Taxiway C as Runway 28R
because Runway 28L was unlit and the closed runway sign was not very visible. Despite
the confusion, DL521 flight crew checked their navigational equipment to ensure they
were aligned Runway 28R and landed without issues. Soon after, the flight crew of
AC759 were about to deal with the same confusion and illusion, however their
navigational equipment was not tuned to the correct ILS frequency (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A).
Less than 15 minutes prior to midnight, one of the two air traffic controllers
working the SFO tower took a break leaving only one controller managing all ground and
air traffic coordination for the airport (NSTB, 2018). The FAA requires two controllers to
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be present at all times at an ATC tower with the exception of light air traffic conditions,
when one controller may handle traffic. However, if aircraft have to wait in line to depart,
as was the case at the time of the incident, then traffic is heavy and not light. When the
SFO air traffic controller went on break, four aircraft were waiting in line on Taxiway C
to take off from Runway 28R (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A).
At 23:46 hours, the remaining air traffic controller cleared AC759 to land on
Runway 28R. Without the correct lateral guidance to aid the captain, the aircraft lined up
with the lighted right-handed paved surface, which was actually Taxiway C. At this time,
the first officer was busy with setting the heading and altitude for a missed approach in
the event it was needed. The first officer was also facing issues finding the runway
heading on the charts, which is why the first officer did not observe the captain align the
aircraft with the wrong surface (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A).
When AC759 descended 600 feet, the captain observed unusual anomalies on the
runway they lined up with, and promptly instructed the first officer to contact the air
traffic controller. The first officer told the controller that they could see lights across the
Runway 28R, and asked the controller to confirm they were cleared to land. These lights
were actually external lights on the four aircraft waiting to depart on Taxiway C. The air
traffic controller assessed the ground radar and observed no conflicts on Runway 28R.
Seven seconds afterwards, the controller informed the flight crew that there was no one
on Runway 28R except AC759 itself. This communication implies that the air traffic
controller had not fathomed that the lights the AC759 reported indicated that aircraft was
aligned with Taxiway C. Furthermore, the flight crew had not realized they were aligned
with the wrong surface when the controller told them no one was on the Runway 28R
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except them. This highlights the high workload the controller was experiencing,
underlined by the extended time he took to reply and the fatigue the flight crew were
experiencing could have led to a lack of situational awareness under the circumstances.
The controller could see from the control tower that the aircraft was slightly aligned to
the right of the runway, but found this to be not unusual as the angle of line of sight from
the control tower afforded this (parallax), as such he could not tell that aircraft was
aligned with Taxiway C (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A).
Descending at 200 feet, the flight crew of AC759 sensed something was out of
place. They could not differentiate between the aircraft queued on Taxiway C and its
edge lights because the aircraft wing- and tail- lights mixed in with the centerline and
edge lights of the taxiway. Unbeknownst to both the controller and AC759, the flight
crew of these aircraft on Taxiway C realized what was happening. The captain for the
United Airlines aircraft at the head of the queue spoke on the tower frequency and asked
where AC759 was going, and said that AC759 was on Taxiway C. The flight crew of
Philippine Airlines switched on its landing lights to alert AC759 of the impending
danger. AC759 overflew the United Airlines aircraft at 100 feet AGL and descended
further over the Philippine Airlines aircraft. The landing lights of the Philippine Airlines
aircraft prompted the AC759 flight crew to call for a go around at 84 feet AGL. As the
engines advanced, AC759 overflew the Philippine Airlines aircraft at 65 feet AGL, only a
minuscule clearance above the 55-foot tail of the Philippine Airlines aircraft. The air
traffic controller ordered a missed approach four seconds after AC759 had already
initiated its go around and was climbing.
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Ascending through 200 feet, AC759 overflew the remaining aircraft on Taxiway
C, two United Airlines flights headed for Sydney and Cancun. Had the flight crew of
AC759 waited for the controllers orders to initiate the go around, they would have been
left with only one second to prevent a disaster. The actions of the United Airlines flight
Captain stating of the tower frequency that AC759 was on the taxiway and the Philippine
Airlines aircraft crew turning on its bright landing lights alerted AC759 of the conditions
and they took instant action. The air traffic controller realized late what would have
happened. Following the go-around and safe landing, the flight crew of AC759 went to
their hotel and discussed what had happened, and decided to file an incident report in the
morning. Unfortunately, NTSB got wind of the incident many days later, by which point,
the cockpit voice recording data from the AC759 incident was erased (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A). Even though the centerline lights of the taxiway
were green and significantly dimmer, the DL521 flight crew that had landed before
AC759 faced the same confusion with the parallel Runways 28L and 28R, and Taxiway
C (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A). For ease of the reference, Figure 3.10
recaps the AC759 incident timeline of events in the final phases of the initial visual
approach.
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Figure 3.10
AC759 Incident Timeline of Events

Source: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 2018-A, p.8)
3.2.5

Component 5 – Examination of Loss at the Physical Level
This component of the CAST analysis encompassed two parts:
1. Determine the degree of contribution of the physical controls, operational
controls, dysfunction in interactions, pitfalls in coordination and
communication, physical failure, and unaddressed disruptions to the
incident.
2. Establish the reasons behind the inadequacy of the physical controls that
led to the wrong surface event by posing questions and providing answers.
The physical controls in place at the time of the AC 759 incident were the ATC

Safety Control Structure’s surveillance systems for air traffic control, the Airline Safety
Control Structure’s automated systems equipped on aircraft, and the Airport Safety
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Control Structure’s navigational aids that provided electronic and visual guidance to the
airfield.
3.2.5.1 Air Traffic Surveillance Systems – ATC Safety Control Structure
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) systems are designed to
detect objects, particularly aircraft and other vehicles on the airfield. The system
then provides visual images of these environmental conditions on a display screen
in the ATCT. The ASSC also provides ATC with a visual and an aural alert when
it detects objects on track for collision.
Question 1ATC: Why did the ASSC not detect the position of AC759 on the
approach and alert ATC?
Answer 1ATC: The ASSC was not designed to detect or predict aircraft
arrivals on a taxiway. According to the system’s parameters, it acted as per its
intended purpose. Moreover, there was a 12-second period, where the ASSC did
not display AC759 on the ATC screen. This is because the aircraft was not in the
systems’ coverage area. This shows that the ASSC behaved according to its set
parameters, however, it also highlights the limitation in situational awareness it
provided ATC. The limited range of the ASSC and its coverage of the runways
only, reduced the situational awareness of ATC and left them uninformed about
the imminent hazardous condition. In addition, the ASSC initially had predicted
AC759 would land on Runway 28R (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018A).
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Question 2ATC: Why did the ASSC initially predict that AC759 would land
on Runway 28R?
Answer 2ATC: This is because the FMS Bridge Visual approach is
configured for an arrival path at an angle/offset to Runway 28R, and so the first
part of the approach aligns with Taxiway C. The flight crew then has to manually
tune the ILS to frequency 111.7 and execute a visual sidestep at the San Mateo
Bridge to align with the Runway 28R centerline. This procedure keeps the aircraft
away from the approach to Runway 28L and, for noise abatement, away from
Foster City (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A).
3.2.5.2 Automated Aircraft Systems – Airline Safety Control Structure
Air Canada’s choice of automated features for their aircraft influenced the
workload and efficiency of the flight crew. The Enhanced Ground Proximity and
Warning Systems (EGPWS) software comes with the option of additional and
complementary features such as Runway Awareness and Advisory Systems
(RAAS) and Smart Landing. RAAS offers services such as the issuance of alerts
and advisories that would enhance situational awareness of the flight crew and
Smart Landing offers aural announcements and visual aids that support situational
awareness for the flight crew. The incident aircraft, including the entire fleet of
A320-200 at Air Canada, was not equipped with the RAAS or Smart Landing
System features. Moreover, Honeywell’s EGPWS Pilot’s Guide informs that
RAAS needs a GPS source to function and the AC759 aircraft was not equipped
with this GPS (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A, p.26).
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Question 1AIRLINE: Why was the aircraft not equipped with RAAS?
Answer 1AIRLINE: This is because in Air Canada's fleet of A320-200s, some
aircraft were equipped with the required GPS and others were not. The AC759
aircraft was not equipped with the required GPS. Had the airline opted on
providing the entire fleets’ EGPWS with the RAAS and Smart Landing feature,
the sensory notification provided by these systems would have alerted the flight
crew to the discrepancies in the aircraft’s position on the approach. Instead, the
flight crew, already fatigued, faced an increase in workload and reduced
situational awareness due to the absence of these features. This resulted in the
potential for human error that increases significantly with increased stress and
workload. This highlights an organizational failure to automate tasks that the
flight crew had to execute themselves. Had the aircraft been equipped with
RAAS, it would have emitted an aural alert stating: “Caution Taxiway, Caution
Taxiway” (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A, p.26).
3.2.5.3 Navigational Aids – Airport Safety Control Structure
Airfield lighting and other visual navigational aids provided cues for pilots
as to determine their location on the airfield. However, many authors refer to an
airport’s surface as a sea of lights that can make it difficult to distinguish between
various facilities. At the time of the AC759 incident, Taxiway C was equipped
with green centerline lights that were far dimmer than the centerline and edge
lighting of Runway 28R. Furthermore, a closed runway marker was positioned at
the approach and departure ends of Runway 28L. The marker was a large, white
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flashing “X” symbol 20.5 feet wide by 20.5 feet high flashing on and off at
intervals of 2.5 seconds, as per FAA standards. However, at the time of the
incident, the AC759 flight crew, and that of the preceding aircraft DL521,
reported that they did not sight an “X” marker on Runway 28L.
Question 1AIRPORT: Why did flight crew perceive Taxiway C perceived as a
runway even though its centerline lights were different and dimmer than Runway
28R?
Answer 1AIRPORT: Although Taxiway C was dimmer and had green
centerline lighting, it is possible that the four aircraft queued for departure on the
taxiway distorted the visual image. The anti-collision flashing lights at the end of
the wingtips of the queueing aircraft could have led to the misconception that the
taxiway was a runway. Aircraft are equipped with anti-collision lights at their
wingtips with a flashing sequence to alert other to the presence of the aircraft on
an airfield. The video footage of the AC759 incident, retrieved from the NTSB
docket, revealed that the white strobe lights of the queueing aircraft were slightly
faster than the sequenced flashing of the ALSF-2 for Runway 28R. This could
have led to a misconception that the strobe lights of the aircraft on Taxiway C
were the sequenced flashers of the ALSF-2 for Runway 28R. The captain of the
preceding flight DL521 corroborated this, by stating that he saw lights on
Taxiway C that gave the impression that the taxiway was a runway (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A, p.51).
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Since the lights were positioned in a straight line, it could have led to the
confusion that the lights were a runway centerline.
Question 2AIRPORT: Why could the two arriving flight crew, DL521 and
AC759, not see the Runway 28L closed marker even though it complied with FAA
standards?
Answer 2AIRPORT: An analysis of the images included in the airport
specialist report of the NTSB docket brought to light some circumstantial
elements that could have led to the ineffectiveness of the runway closure marker.
There were bright construction lights to the left of Runway 28L that were
positioned at a close vertical distance to the approach end of Runway 28L. For
flight crew who were too far out to distinguish between the two bright white
lights, this may have led to a confusion of geographical positioning of these
significant markers in relation to the runway. Moreover, there were very bright
lights positioned to the left of Runway 28R. Images from the airport specialist
report and statements issued by DL521 first officer corroborate this evidence. The
first officer of DAL521 stated that: “The construction lights were so bright
we could not determine the location of the inboard runway, 28L. So I
initially thought the construction was on a taxiway and we might be lined
up on Rwy 28L and the taxiway on the right could be Rwy 28R.”
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A, p. 9).
As depicted in Figures 3.11 and 3.12, the presence of additional bright
lighting from the aircraft on Taxiway C, the construction lights to the left of
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Runway 28L, and other bright light to the left of Runway 28R likely exacerbated
the confusion in what the incident flight crew were seeing; thereby contributing to
the loss of situational awareness. The visual portrayed by the aircraft on Taxiway
C led to the confirmation bias that AC759 was aligned with a runway.
Figure 3.11
Construction lighting positioning adjacent Runway 28l at the time of the incident

Source: Airports Specialist Report (Wentz, 2018)
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Figure 3.12
The bright white lights in the yellow circle left of Runway 28R

Source: Airports Specialist Report (Wentz, 2018)
Electronic navigational aids such as ILS guide aircraft on approach by
ensuring appropriate alignment of the aircraft to the runway centerline. At the
time AC759 incident, the Air Canada’s database did not include automation for
ILS approaches Runway 28R. This limitation required manual tuning of the ILS
to the correct frequency in order for the aircraft to fly and maintain in correct
alignment with the runway centerline. However, the first officer did not tune the
ILS.
Question 3AIRPORT: Why did the first officer forget to tune the ILS to the
correct radio frequency?
Answer 3AIRPORT: Many aircraft have features that can automatically tune
the ILS. However this aircraft could not because Air Canada’s FMS database did
not have the procedures for Runway 28R. This implies that the flight crew was
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not used to having to manually tune to the ILS, therefore since this task was out of
the ordinary from their usual routine of tasks during arrival, compounded by the
adverse impacts of the circadian low it likely led to the first officer missing this
task in the routine. Air Canada stated in their report to the NTSB that tuning the
ILS is done manually and is not a normal procedure for an FMS Visual Approach.
Question 4AIRPORT: Why did the Runway 28R ILS frequency have to be
manually tuned if most aircraft have the capability to automatically tune to ILS
frequencies?
Answer 4AIRPORT: The FMS Bridge Visual Approach for Runway 28R was
the only approach that Air Canada’s A320 database did not have. This is why
Runway 28R was the only visual approach that had to be manually tuned by flight
crew. This would imply that the manual tuning of the ILS frequency was not a
usual procedure for the flight crew. Air Canada uses United Airlines’ approach
database for its flight operations and as such, United Airlines developed the
procedure for the approach to Runway 28R. At the time, the database did not have
a frequency for the FMS to automatically tune for the 28R approach, and Air
Canada’s policy only enabled alterations to the database only if data was
incorrect. Since the data that United Airlines made for this procedure lacked a
frequency for automated tuning, the ILS had to be manually tuned by a pilot. This
highlights a system and procedural failure, as having to manually tune the ILS
increased the flight crew’s workload, while they were fatigued. This task is
widely and commonly automated in most aircraft.
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By using United Airlines’ approach database, Air Canada limited
themselves to the techniques that were best suited and tailored for the United
Airlines fleet and flight crew, thereby leaving the Air Canada pilots to deal with
unforeseen discrepancies that may not suit to the needs of the Air Canada pilots
and fleet. Furthermore, Air Canada’s policy of changing procedures in the
database only if the data was incorrect prevented the airlines’ fleet from having
the most up to date system with auto tuning capabilities. This procedural and
organizational failure led to the flight crew and aircraft being left to deal with
anomalies like out of routine tasks that increase their workload. This one policy
likely prevented the safe arrival of flight AC759, leading to a near collision
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A, p.3).
3.2.6

Component 6 – Investigation of the Safety Control Structures’ Higher-level
This component of the CAST analysis investigated how and why the higher level

of the safety control structure contributed to the incident. This entailed establishing why
and how each layer played a part in the overall ineffective control during the event. The
analysis targeted the control layers above the physical functions and established the
characteristics of these layers of control. These included the obligations of responsibility
linked to the prevention of a loss, the unsafe or nonexistent control tasks, and the
circumstantial components and defects of the process model.
SFO has a ‘Fly Quiet Program’ for late night and early morning arrivals and
departures. Its purpose is to encourage individual airlines to operate as quietly as possible
at SFO. All of these cautions stress on the requirement for crews to stay to the right of
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Runway 28L and not infringe on the adjacent approach airspace. The FMS Bridge Visual
Approach is configured to arrive at an angle to Runway 28R, and at the first part of the
approach aligns with Taxiway C. This protocol keeps aircraft away from the approach to
Runway 28L and, for noise abatement, away from Foster City. When SFO shut down
Runway 28L for construction, there were no requirements to fly the non-precision FMS
Bridge Visual Approach except for the Fly Quiet Program, and as such, a precision ILS
approach could have been administered (Comeau-AC report, 2017).
3.2.6.1 Analysis of Responsible Actors
This section provides a detailed analysis of the three frontline actors,
namely: the captain and the first officer of AC759, and the air traffic controller on
duty. The analysis focuses on:
1. Responsibilities of each actor and their duties related to the incident.
2. Contributing factors (actions, lack of actions, decisions) to the hazardous
situation and why.
3. Flaws in the process or mental model that contributed further to their actions.
4. Contextual elements explaining the choices, actions, and any flaws in the
process model.
Captain. The main role and responsibility of the pilot flying (PF) and is to
manage the flight path, therefore they always must be engaged in actively flying
the aircraft, this applies even when auto-pilot control is engaged (FAA, 2015). As
such, if an emergency situation arises whereby instant action is necessary the PIC
has the authority to deviate from any precedent in the General Subpart A and
Flight Rules subpart B (FAA, 2020). This precedent reflects the appropriate
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action of the AC 759 flight crew to initiate take off go around at an altitude of 89
feet AGL when the flight crew realized something was not right. This is notable
because ATC ordered a go-around three seconds after the PIC had already
initiated the go-around (Moler, 2017). Had the captain waited for instructions
from ATC to go around, a disastrous collision would have occurred. Moreover,
the NTSB report of the incident also concluded that the flight crews’ low-altitude
go-around averted collision with one or more aircraft on Taxiway C (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A, p.69).
The captain’s reserve duty period began at 11:13 EDT on July 7. 2017. At
11:49 EDT, crew scheduling informed him of a round-trip flight job from Toronto
Pearson International Airport to San Francisco International Airport. He did not
take any naps that day and reported for work by 19:40 EDT (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A).
Air Canada’s standard operating procedures indicate that, the pilot flying
(in this case, the captain) was supposed to review the approach programming and
complete an approach briefing, which included verifying that the primary
navigational aid (ILS) identifier and frequency were properly set. However, there
is no record of the captain verbally communicating with the first officer about the
ILS, nor the captain did not check the settings of the ILS. Both of these tasks were
responsibilities of the captain. The manual also indicates that the PF must monitor
position via both external references and references to navigational systems.
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Question 1PF: Why did the captain not communicate with the first officer
or check that the ILS was properly tuned?
Answer 1PF: Most aircraft these days come with auto-tune capabilities for
the ILS. Air Canada’s report has also stated that manual tuning of the ILS is not a
normal procedure of the FMS. This indicates that manually tuning an ILS is an
out of routine task that is usually automated. Since the approach frequency for
Runway 28R was not in the Air Canada database, this unusual task was up to the
flight crew to accomplish. Although it is a simple procedure, the flight crew were
out of practice and the habit of checking the ILS settings. These factors, coupled
with the circadian low and fatigue, the flight crew likely missed this step.
First Officer. The main role and responsibility of the pilot monitoring
(PM) is tracking the current and projected path of flight of the aircraft and energy
levels. The PM must be informed of all ATC clearances, instructions and aircraft
status, thereby supporting the PF around the clock. This duty includes observing
the aircraft and system statuses, voicing any deviations from the planned flight
path that the PM may perceive and anticipate (FAA, 2015). However, the first
officer claimed that he could not recall if he saw the NOTAM for the closure of
Runway 28L. During one of the post incident interviews, the first officer stated
that his observations were focused inside the cockpit because he was completing
his other duties as the pilot monitoring such as setting the altitude and heading for
a missed approach if required (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A,
p.5). Additionally, he claimed that he was struggling to find the heading data on
the approach chart and as a result he had to refer to the airport chart. If the first
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officer had difficulty reading the approach chart, he should have asked the
Captain for assistance.
Question 1PM: Why did the first officer not ask the captain for help?
Answer1PM: His difficulty finding the heading information on the chart
could be the reason why he may have thought to deal with it later. The first officer
might have missed the step to manually tune the ILS frequency because Air
Canada flight crew were not required to do this for any approach other than the
FMS Bridge Visual Approach; this lack of habit or practice of having to manually
tune the ILS likely created the opportunity for an error of omission. The duties,
responsibilities, and inactions of the PM are discussed further in Component 7
under Crew Resource Management.
Air Traffic Controller. The air traffic controller who handled AC759 had
reported for duty at 22:30 hours on the day of the incident, July 7, 2017, At first,
he did the duties of the ground controller but at around 23:49 hours or seven
minutes before the incident, all the positions and frequencies at the ATCT were
combined because the other air traffic controller went on a recuperative break.
Both air traffic controllers made the decision to combine all positions to one
controller after evaluating the impending traffic and traffic radar displays because
they deemed it safe to do so. While on duty for the single-operations, the
controller who handled the incident aircraft administered holding instructions for
the aircraft on Taxiway C. FAA Order JO 7210.3Z (November 10, 2015) states
that when holding procedures are being applied, local control positions should not
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be consolidated with other non-control duties (National Transportation Safety
Board, 2018-A, p.19). Consolidating the control positions was a misstep and the
incident controller should have asked the other controller to return to duty because
traffic needed to hold short. Moreover, the double workload of a consolidated
single controller after doing ground-control may have required time for the
incident controller to orient himself and handle all positions at once.
The controller stated that he had no indication of AC759’s misalignment
until he observed the aircraft on short final seeming extremely strange. This was
when the controller decided to tell AC759 to perform a go-around. This highlights
a deficiency for a system that keeps the controllers at ATCT informed on the
positioning of the incoming aircraft.
Question 1CONTROLLER: Why were there no systems or software available to
alert the controller about AC759’s misalignment?
Answer 1CONTROLLER: As previously described in Component 5, the ASSC
was not designed to monitor and detect attempted landing on a taxiway. This
highlights a key limitation of the ASSC, because what the system cannot see also
leaves the controller blind to a misaligned final approach. Because the controller
could not observe the aircraft on the ASSC display, he could not take note of
situation and administer corrective instructions to the flight crew as necessary.
Additionally, the ASSC had initially predicted the aircraft would land on Runway
28R.
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Since the ATC positions were combined to a single controller in charge
seven minutes before the incident, the controllers’ workload was doubled and as a
result, the controller took up to seven seconds to reply when AC759 inquired
whether Runway 28R was empty. In these seven seconds, the aircraft traveled
about 1,700 feet by the time the controller confirmed that the runway was empty.
The controller administered the go around instruction three seconds after the
flight crew already began go-around procedures on its own. The controller did as
much as he could to do the job right. However, he only had an angled long
distance window view of the aircraft, and since the ASSC could not detect aircraft
attempting to land on taxiways the controller was left unaware of the hazardous
situation. From the analysis of the ATC voice recording the NTSB concluded that
the controller was engaged and calm during communications while ACA759 was
on final approach however the controller took up to 7 seconds to reply.
3.2.6.2 Analysis of Safety Layer – NOTAM
A Notice to Airmen, also known as NOTAM is a notice communication
carrying important data for flight crew personnel. The data it carries is
information that was not known early enough to be conveyed in advance by any
other method. NOTAMs convey information about the evolving status of a given
component in the National Airspace System, the content of the notices can
include a vast range of data, such as the characteristics of any alterations,
condition status and integration of any elements concerned with the airport
facility including closure of runways and taxiways, procedural updates and
changes or a potential hazard in the system. This indicates that a NOTAM is
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meant to inform pilots on last minute changes in the active conditions of any
procedural, regulatory, maintenance, hazard or airfield status in order to enhance
their situational awareness and avert any potentially hazardous conditions. It also
indicates that it is the last and only means of message conveyance used by the
frontline actors in the system, as such there is a lack of instant communication
methods concerning the continuously changing aspects in an airport’s
environment and weather.
Figure 3.13 provides snapshot of a section of the NOTAM that contains
the message for closure of Runway 28L, as highlighted in the yellow rectangle.
Initially, AC759 was supposed to land on Runway 28L and this message
conveyance system was used to communicate condition updates to the flight crew.

Question 1NOTAM: Why was the NOTAM issued before the AC759 incident
inadequate at bringing the Runway 28L closure to attention the flight crew?
Answer 1NOTAM: Even though it was the only medium of communication
on critical airspace updates for the safe arrival of AC759, it did not visually stand
out or indicate that this was a critical update to note. This is important because the
presentation of all NOTAMS is uniform throughout the four pages of NOTAMs
with no highlighted sections under the bookmark tab “AIRPORT NOTAMs”.
This NOTAM was part of the 27-page flight plan or briefing package the flight
crew received. Moreover, the flight plan was an updated or second version of the
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initial flight plan. The first officer was informed of the second version by flight
dispatch only when he arrived at Toronto Pearson International Airport.

Figure 3.13
NOTAM provided to the flight crew with runway closure notification.

Source: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 2018-A, p.35).
Prior to the second release, the first officer had downloaded the initial
flight plan in order to go over its flight route. If the first officer reviewed the flight
plan and then had to go over the new flight plan as well, then this could have led
to an expectation bias, where the resemblance of the information presented on
both could have led to the first officer missing such a crucial note that did not
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stand out. Expectation bias is harboring a strong belief or outlook towards a
specific outcome (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020-G, p.11). In this case,
the first officer most likely expected to see the exact same information since he
was told that the reason for the generation of the new flight plan was due to the
“increase in the zero fuel weight”. Since the flight was initially supposed to land
on Runway 28L, it is likely that the runway closure update was not present in the
initial flight plan that the first officer reviewed. Additionally, if the first officer
had to go over 27 pages of the flight plan two times, and the second time was
during the evening when he arrived at the airport closer to his circadian low. It is
likely that the first officer would have missed such a small piece of data in the
many pages of information that had to be processed. This indicates an increased
workload that could have led to confusion in the first officer from the beginning.
In the AC759 incident report published by the NTSB, it is stated that “the
information about runway closures provided in NOTAMs and ATIS
broadcasts/messages is not necessarily a reliable means for ensuring that
pilots are aware of the closure information”(National Transportation Safety
Board, 2018-A, p. 63). This indicates that the NTSB believed that NOTAMS was
not an effective medium of communication with the pilots. As the only medium of
communication for pilots in flight, this indicates that an improvement is required
on the current NOTAMs in order to enhance its efficacy (NTSB
Operational/Human Factors Performance Group, 2018).
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3.2.6.3 Unsafe Control Task
The CAST Analysis identified manual tuning of the ILS was an unsafe
control task during the AC759 incident. Since ILS tuning is widely automated
nowadays, this out of routine task demands more from pilots who are already
subject to heavy workload and a low circadian state. This unusual task of tuning
the ILS resulted in a lower level of situational awareness (outside the cockpit) due
to the lack of practice or habit of the manual tuning procedure. This lack of
practice or habit combined with the flight crews’ state of circadian low likely led
to a lower memory retention. A lower memory retention rate may have also led to
the manual tuning of the ILS being forgotten.
3.2.7 Component 7 - Contributing System Alterations
The CAST analysis also established dynamics and alterations in the systems that
contributed to the AC759 incident by reviewing industry and organizational safety
culture, crew resource management, and fatigue.
3.2.7.1 Industry and Organizational Safety Culture
In the aviation industry, regulation is a key tool used to manage and
govern safety compliance. Transport Canada’s Advisory Circular (AC) 505-003
on Safety Management Systems for Design Organizations, outlines a Safety
Management Systems (SMS) integration guidance for organizations and outlines
the boundaries of compliance in accordance with the standards and regulations.
The aims of SMS are to enhance accountability as an industry, foster a positive
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and persistent safety culture and to enhance safety performance of aviation firms
(Transport Canada, 2008).
The AC outlines that the model safety culture fosters an ambiance of
openness and exhibits support for the work systems and personnel. A key
component of this is good communication amongst management and employees
and is important to an effective and competent SMS. Senior management have to
be accessible and determined to make alterations as necessary to improve safety.
The consistent aim is to enhance safety by means of proactive management rather
than reactive compliance with rules. With comparison to the incident flight crew,
neither of the pilots communicated with each other about any concerns and
struggles. The pilot monitoring could have asked the pilot flying for help to read
the charts. The Pilot Flying was also supposed to verbally ask and confirm the
tuning of the ILS, which he did not do. The only time the flight crew
communicated any concerns were when they had to make a transmission to the
ATC controller. This highlights a scarcity of communication between the first
officer and captain (Transport Canada, 2008).
Additionally, the AC has a section on non-punitive reporting policy,
whereby since they understand that error is a normal part of human nature and
performance and cannot be completely exterminated. Transport Canada has
indicated that organizations should have a non-punitive reporting policy. This
perspective and approach aligns with and is due to the requirements of an
effective safety culture, whereby the ambiance of openness allows employees to
do their jobs and does not foster a culture of assigning blame or administering
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punitive consequences for errors. This safety culture encourages and promotes
openness and cooperation as it allows staff to feel at ease about reporting and
openly discussing errors or likely unsafe actions and situations. Nonetheless, an
error-tolerant SMS still needs adequate accountability as well as responsibility
and staff should get punctual feedback on their concerns. Moreover, the AC
outlines that staff should be given a chance to contribute to the progress of the
SMS in the organization as it promotes an enhanced safety culture (Transport
Canada, 2008).
3.2.7.2 Crew Resource Management
Air Canada provides pilots with a crew resource management (CRM)
guidebook or manual that covers a variety of topics including situational
awareness, decision making, active monitoring, communicating workload
management, threat and error management and planning. A different document,
the CRM Competency Guide addresses the responsibilities of each pilot with
regards to the areas listed previously (National Transportation Safety Board,
2018-A, p. 28). The situational awareness section of Air Canada’s CRM
competency guidebook informs that a captain (pilot flying) is supposed to
“recognize and effectively respond to indications of reduced situational
awareness from other crew members.” The captain of AC759 did not recognize
and respond to the first officer’s inaction or misstep with the tuning of the ILS.
The captain was supposed to ask about the tuning to the ILS; however, he did not
do so.
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In the section of active monitoring and threat and error management
procedures, the Air Canada guide states that the pilot monitoring was supposed to
“communicate all errors, omissions, and differences in situational awareness
and ambiguities to the PF assertively”, and to “detect deviations from the
desired aircraft trajectory and take appropriate action.” The pilot monitoring did
not communicate with the pilot flying, he was unaware that the ILS not tuned, this
could be due to the other planning activities he was occupied with such as the
missed approach and due to the circadian low he was at that likely led to him to
forget. Since ILS auto-tune capabilities are common across aircraft, it is unusual
and out of the ordinary for the flight crew to have to tune the ILS. This indicates a
need for practice during training procedures so that pilots remain aware of this
step as part of the routine.
The manual also mentioned that the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring
should closely monitor flight parameters and that the pilot monitoring should call
out any deviation that went beyond the set parameters. The incident flight crew
communicated to a minimal extent and the only indication to this was their
interviews. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was never analyzed because the
CVR for the incident flight was erased by the time Air Canada was notified of the
investigation by the NTSB. Other pilots had rated the CRM skills of the first
officer and Captain who had previously flown with them high ratings. One check
airman was concerned about the first officer’s situational awareness; however, he
also described the first officer’s CRM as good. This was corroborated by the
simulator instructors who conducted the first officer’s trials to upgrade to Captain,
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they said he struggled to maintain situational awareness and did not act in
accordance with standards of Transport Canada (National Transportation Safety
Board, 2018-A).
Question: Should captains in command of first officers with difficulty
maintaining situational awareness be informed of this area of weakness of the
First Officer?
Answer: It would greatly enhance the captain’s CRM management
capabilities as the captain could take the initiative to be more communicative and
check for status updates from the first officer more often. There does come a
question of disclosure of private information into this as that is an ethical and
legal concern. The potential benefit obtained from the enhanced safety and CRM
would have to be weighed against these concerns.
3.2.7.3 Fatigue
Fatigue in the Responsible Actors. The AC759 first officer took a 90
minutes nap in the afternoon and had been awake for over 12 hours by the time of
the incident. The ATC incident controller had also worked a daytime shift of 8
hours from 05:30 to 13:30 hours on the day of the incident. The incident
controller had also taken a 45 minute nap between his two shifts and claimed he
felt rested for his shift. However, the captain did not take any naps on the day of
the incident and as such, he started feeling fatigued half way through the flight
right after the aircraft was navigated through a thunderstorm area. The Captain
had been awake for over 19 hours by the time the incident occurred. His fatigue
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could be the reason why the captain communicated less and did not ask about the
ILS. Air Canada’s Flight Operation Manual informs that naps can acutely enhance
the level of alertness and performance as it decreases the length of time of
continuously being awake. The manual also states that napping is the only
countermeasure for reversing the need for sleep, which is the physiological reason
for fatigue (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A, p.29).
The incident took place at around 23:56 hours, which was about 02:56
EDT for the flight crew’s normal body clock. Both the captain and first officer
would generally go to sleep by 00:00 EDT or 12am, so both the pilots were awake
and actively working at a time when they would normally be asleep. This likely
made them more vulnerable to the impact of fatigue, which they started feeling
after navigating the thunderstorms. Maneuvering the thunderstorms took up the
first half of the flight journey and likely drained the flight crew and made them
worn to fatigue. As mentioned before, the first officer had been awake for over 12
hours and the captain had be awake for over 19 hours. The incident flight crew
were likely fatigued, and thus could have experienced difficulty in assimilating
new information such as the NOTAM for the closure of Runway 28L (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A).
Canadian Fatigue Regulations. Based on Canadian flight rest
requirements and duty times the pilots could have been awake for 14 hours and an
additional 3 hours if any unexpected circumstance arise. In contrast to the FAA
guidance on “flight and duty and rest requirements”- 14 CFR Part 117, the flight
and duty time of first officer meet the standards of Part 117. The Captain on the
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other hand, was acting as a long-call reserve pilot, that means he was on call for
24 hours and as such the flight and duty time of the Captain did not comply with
the guidance of Part 117. The guidance of Part 117 outlines that pilots must be
given a 12 hour notice of reporting time if the pilot enters the stage of circadian
low. The Captain was assigned to the flight at 1149 EDT and reported for duty at
1940 EDT that accounts for only 7 hours and 51 minutes of the notice period.
Transport Canada does not have any rulings on the time limit of notice of report
time. This highlights some short comings in the regulations of Transport Canada,
as it shows that their regulations have not integrated safeguards against circadian
lows into their rulings on duty time limit or reserve pilots and their notice of
report time. Moreover, the flight and duty time rulings at the time of the incident
at Transport Canada were in effect since 1996 and as such the Canadian Aviation
Regulatory Council working group started to update their regulations on fatigue in
2010. Transport Canada had just launched the revised draft proposal of new
regulations in 2017. This 24 year lag in updating regulations concerning fatigue
highlights that Transport Canada progresses slowly in their rule changing and
updating, an organization slow to change can hinder the safety and efficiency of
the professionals in the industry (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018-A,
p.37).
3.2.8

Component 8 – CAST Recommendations
The last component of the CAST Analysis provides recommendations designed to

enhance safety in future circumstances that may be similar to the AC759 incident. The
CAST recommendations follow an assessment of the shortfalls and gaps discovered in
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the safety control structures in the aviation industry. These recommendations are also
linked to physical controls, policies, organizational procedures and best practices that
were found to be lacking.
Recommendation 1: Build a software program that reads NOTAMs and alerts
flight crew to critical information and action needed/recommended. NOTAMs can be
long enough to cover several pages, some of it being weather related data. A method or
software to pick out critical information from NOTAMs would be a helpful tool that
would automate the manual tasks of pilots industry wide. This could address the
limitations and the problem of long, uniform looking NOTAMs for pages on end that
may be hard to retain to memory. This could also enhance last minute update
communication systems with flight crew.
Recommendation 2: Inform captains of training records/observations about first
officers who have difficulty maintaining situational awareness or are easily distracted.
Although there is an ethical and legal barrier to disclosure of private information,
information like this may be critical to the captain to maintain effective CRM and
navigate a safe flight. The enhancement it would bring to situational awareness, safety
and CRM would compensate for any likely errors or missteps.
Recommendation 3: Expand ASSC capabilities to incorporate graphical
depictions of aircraft and vehicles around taxiways that may pose a risk on the airfield.
The air traffic controller was unaware of the situation of AC759 because the systems that
were there to aid him were also limited by their operational capabilities and functional
restrictions. For runways with full-length parallel taxiways, this would provide a
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significant safety enhancement by improving the controller’s situational awareness and in
full knowledge of imminent hazardous situations.
Recommendation 4: Maintain pilots’ skills by practicing manual tasks that are
normally out of routine. For example, skills can be enhanced by integrating appropriate
procedures into recurrent training programs for pilots. Airlines can add a practice task of
manually tuning the ILS to ensure Pilots are in practice and in routine for manually
tuning the ILS. Since SFO Airport requires the use of the quiet visual approach,
providing an additional briefing or advisory or software aid to support aircraft for manual
tuning of ILS would be helpful to the flight crew in order to mitigate hazardous
conditions especially during maintenance and construction work. These measures would
reduce the likelihood of flight crew forgetting to manually tune the ILS when needed and
thereby would enhance safety.
Recommendation 5: Improve runway closure marking guidelines to clearly
indicate a runway is for construction, especially during nighttime hours.
Recommendation 6: Construction lighting and other unnecessarily distracting
lighting on the airfield should be configured to be dimmer than the runway closure
marker and runway lights. This solution allows for a distinction in the lighting levels and
therefore the visual image that the pilots see. This could enhance the situational
awareness of flight crew and prevent confusion. The two clumps of bright light to the left
of both the parallel runways in the AC759 may have diminished the effectiveness of the
runway closure marking to stand out as a sign.
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Recommendation 7: Organizations should review and update their policies and
best practices frequently in order to ensure they are up to date with new technology,
findings and services. This especially applies to Air Canada as their policy to not make
changes to the approach database unless a piece of data was wrong led to the missed
opportunity and benefit of automating the ILS tuning of the aircraft for approach of
Runway 28R. Transport Canada should also especially review and amend their policies at
five year intervals as new studies and findings shed new light on safety concerns and
factors that influence it such as fatigue. In a high risk, complex industry like aviation,
new research and technology is emerging every day that alters the control systems and
structures of the aviation industry. Aviation authorities must keep up to date in order to
alleviate any potential hazards that may arise from newly identified concerns or
technologies.
Recommendation 8: The FAA should consider amending their ruling on ATC
staffing to have two controllers on duty at all times at heavy traffic airports like SFO.
Recommendations 9: Foster an industry-wide initiative to mandate the ILS autotuning capabilities for aircraft approaches. The auto-tuning of ILS by aircraft FMS has
become so common in the industry, that asking a pilot to manually tune it is an out of
routine task that is very critical to the safe navigation of aircraft to the correct destination.
As a result, this would become a risk for a pilot flying in a state of circadian low because
they may forget to manually tune the ILS.
Recommendation 10: SFO airport should reconsider the Quiet Visual Approach
for Runway 28R because the runway is located on the far end of the neighboring
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residential zones. Especially during construction work on the airfield, a precision
approach would be a safer buffer with other potential hazards from the construction
around the airfield.
Recommendation 11: Aviation authorities should regulate or at least advise
commercial airlines to equip their fleet with EGPWS and RAAS. Since pilots face an
intensive duty of safely maneuvering aircraft, equipping aircraft with these features
should be considered essential as they enhance the pilot’s situational awareness. With so
many complicated and unknown external as well as internal factors in play, automated
features such as RAAS will improve the flight crews’ situational awareness and thereby
enhance safety.
Recommendation 12: Develop, and integrate into the industry, a graphical GPS
software that displays the positioning of aircraft on approach and gives aural alerts when
an aircraft is off path. Although this would increase the workload of the ATC controller,
it will vastly enhance the situational awareness of the controllers, and the controllers need
only refer to it when it gives an alert of an incorrectly aligned aircraft.
Recommendation 13: NOTAMs bearing last minute changes in runway arrival
configuration should be highlighted in an eye-catching visual format such as a bold,
underlined, brightly colored, or enlarged text. Last minute changes in runway arrival
configuration can lead to a possible opportunity for the flight crew to miss mentally
registering critical new information.
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Recommendation 14: ATC controllers should issue cautionary advisories to
aircraft on arrival to exercise caution in observation and operation when construction is
being conducted on an airport’s airfield.
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Chapter 4
Results of the Study

4.1 Comparison of NTSB and CAST Results
This section provides a comparative analysis between the outcomes of the NTSB
(traditional method) and the CAST analysis. This allowed the study to draw insight from
the distinctions in the two methods investigation methods. Table 4.1 presents the
distinction in findings between the NTSB’s method and the CAST analysis with respect
to safety layers, responsible actors, and physical controls.
Table 4.1
Distinction in the findings between the two investigations.
Incident Investigation Findings

NTSB

CAST

Considers it a Factor

Considers it a Factor

Airfield Lighting

No

Yes

ATC Equipment (ASSC)

No

Yes

Aircraft (ILS auto-tuning, EGPWS,
RAAS)

No

Yes

Flight crew

Yes

Yes

Air Traffic Controller

No

Yes

NOTAM

Yes

Yes

Air Canada Policies and Practices

Yes

Yes

Transport Canada Regulations

Yes

Yes

Cause of Accident

Pilot Error Misidentification of
Taxiway C (probable)
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Organizational
Failure - Air Canada
(underlying)

4.1.1 Findings of Traditional Investigation Method
Although the NTSB investigation touched on some key points in the incident, it
took the approach of finding a culprit with its investigation and assigning blame rather
than trying to understand why the flight crew had to manually tune the ILS in the first
place. Though angle of viewing of the runway closure marker was flawed and the ASSC
was limited in scope, the NTSB still concluded pilot error as the probable cause of the
incident, rather than focusing on the limitations of the equipment detection systems that
hindered situational awareness and gave rise to hazardous situations as the cause of the
incident. Moreover, airport lighting was crucial in identification of correct alignment of
aircraft, however the NTSB concluded and disregarded the serious impacts this posed.
This focus on a root cause of assigning blame, whilst being aware of design flaws leads
to loss of information and risk of incident/ Accident recurrence. This focus on blame
leads to design and system flaws being unaddressed, that pose as risks.
4.1.2 Findings of the CAST Analysis
The CAST perspective of this incident investigation is: the approach should have
been that, even if the pilots had not manually tuned the ILS, other design controls in the
system (ASSC, RAAS, EPWGS, ASDE) should have been designed to be able to detect
and highlight to the misalignment of the aircraft. The controls for error and hazard
mitigation should have been capable enough to alert and prevent the human error of not
manually tuning ILS, because manual tuning is only one small component that stems
from the systemic causes and flaws in the design of the control system/ feedback loop.
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4.2 Results related to the Primary Research Question
The primary research question of this study was: Does a systems approach to
hazardous events involving runway incursions generate different contributing factors or
causes as compared with traditional investigation methods?
The NTSB only focused on where the failure occurred. They did not focus on the
reasons behind the failure involving technical aspects of the safety control structure that
was in place. The NTSB investigation concluded that:
“the probable cause of this incident was the flight crew’s misidentification of
taxiway C as the intended landing runway, that resulted from the
crewmembers’ lack of awareness of the parallel runway closure due to their
ineffective review of notice to airmen (NOTAM) information before the flight
and during the approach briefing. Contributing to the incident were (1) the
flight crew’s failure to tune the instrument landing system frequency for
backup lateral guidance, expectation bias, fatigue due to circadian disruption
and length of continued wakefulness, and breakdowns in crew resource
management and (2) Air Canada’s ineffective presentation of approach
procedure and NOTAM information” (National Transportation Safety Board,
2018-A, p. 68).
In contrast, the CAST analysis found one primary contributing factor and a few
additional contributing factors to the AC759 incident. This incident occurred primarily
due to Air Canada’s ineffectiveness at equipping the A320-200 fleet with the Runway
Awareness and Advisory Systems (RAAS), Enhanced Ground Proximity and Warning
System and Smart Landing situational awareness facilities. The limitations of these assets
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constrained situational awareness of the controllers at the tower and behind the cockpit.
The responsible actors in charge of operating in highly complex systems such as Aircraft
and Air Traffic Control systems are only as good as the equipment and infrastructural
systems in place to be their eyes and ears to gather situational information. The
responsible actors cannot act on matters they are not aware of. Moreover, Air Canada’s
practice, reflecting in their policy, of altering the FMS database only if any information in
it is incorrect and needs to be amended. This policy prevents the airline from making the
necessary infrastructural and technical updates that would enhance efficiency, safety and
situational awareness.
The airfield lighting at the time of the incident presented a misleading visual of
the runways that led to confusion for the incoming flights on final approach.
To sum up, a systems approach to hazardous events involving runway incursions has
generated a range of alternative contributing factors. These contributing factors include:
1. Lack of automation led to incorrect alignment with Taxiway.
2. Lack of information systems such as RAAS, EGPWS and Smart Landing systems
left the flight crew uninformed and unaware, as such they could not take
corrective action.
3. ASSC is limited in detection capabilities and functionality as it cannot detect
incorrect alignment or positioning of incoming aircraft on final approach. This
limitation left ATC controllers unaware of the incorrect positioning of the aircraft
and the potentially hazardous situation.
4. NOTAMs are not very effective at delivering critical information as they have a
uniform design that blends in with pages and pages of countless information.
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These different contributing factors correspond with flaws, weaknesses and
incompetency in the safety control structure of the respective categories. These factors
address the organizational and system inefficiencies that led to the events of flight
AC759. Moreover, it identifies the crucial role automation plays in the synchronization of
work tasks in the cockpit and establishes a layer of safety. Had the aircraft been equipped
with auto-tuning capabilities for the ILS, the window or opportunity of this error or
misstep to occur and resulted a serious incident would not have been a possibility in the
first place.
4.3 Results related to the Secondary Research Questions
The secondary research questions and results generated by the study are as follows:
1. Can CAST be used to identify factors that are related to runway risks?
The CAST analysis identified factors as follows:
a. Misleadingly configured airfield lighting, especially during runway
construction can obscure the visual indicators portrayed of the layout of
the airport.
b. Manual procedures that are commonly automated can pose a risk if
conducted during a state of circadian low. The manual tuning of the ILS is
an example of this.
c. Landing on a runway parallel to a taxiway poses risks when there are
aircraft on the taxiway queued for departure.
d. Incorrect application of Crew Resource Management can result in loss of
management and efficiency. The captain was supposed to verbal confirm
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with the first officer the tuning of the ILS, however, the captain as well did
not do so.
e. Last minute changes in runway arrival configuration can lead to a possible
opportunity for the flight crew to miss critical new information. Which is
why, the CAST analysis recommended last minute changes in runway
arrival configuration should be alerted in an eye-catching visual format
such as a bold, underlined, brightly colored, or enlarged text.
2. What new things can be learned using CAST?
The CAST analysis revealed the following:
a. Controllers and operators are only as good as their systems. Systems need
to be regularly updated to offer as much automation and enhanced
efficiency as possible as this also ensures safety.
b. Organizational policies and practices also need to be reviewed and
improved at regular, appropriate intervals in order to stay current on
policies and effective in practices.
c. Automated capabilities are crucial in lightening the workload of the flight
crew, like manual tuning of the ILS.
d.

Airfield Detection Systems capabilities must be broadened and expanded
to enhance the situational awareness of Air Traffic Controllers. ATC
controllers rely on the information these detection systems provide to
make informed decisions and take or administer the appropriate
instructions and actions befitting the circumstances.

3. Can CAST reveal different underlying causes?

107

The CAST analysis revealed the following:
a. Organizational failure in procedures and policies.
i.

The Air Canada company policy to not alter elements in the
database except if an information is wrong, prevents the upgrade
and update of all information in the database to the most
comprehensive and current information that would help automate
all ILS tuning procedures. The consequences of this policy
impacted the flight crew with a higher workload.

ii.

Air Canada’s failure to ensure the A320-200 fleet are equipped
with RAAS, EGPWS and Smart Landing features prevented the
provision of additional and sufficient equipment and alerts that
enhance the flight crew’s situational awareness of the aircraft, in
the event an ILS is not tuned.

b. The limitations of the current Airport Surface Detection Equipment
(ASDE) like the Airport Surface Surveillance Capabilities (ASSC) to only
detect and monitor vehicles, object and aircraft on the runway for any
imminent collision rather than the entire airfield, like Taxiway C. This
limitation on detection systems or programming for similar scenarios for
taxiways left the ATC controller unaware of the incorrect alignment of
AC759.

108

Chapter 5
Discussion
5.1 Summary of the Study
The purpose of this study was to explore and determine if Causal Analysis Based on
System Theory (CAST) could divulge differing underlying causes in the Taxiway overflight

incident of Air Canada Flight 759 at San Francisco International Airport, in contrast to
the traditional investigation methods used by the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB). In order to understand the mechanics behind the underlying theories and
concepts that are important to the analysis, a literature review of relevant causality
models, applications of CAST, System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes
(STAMP), runway hazards and risks, and runway incursions and excursions. The
literature review revealed key characteristics of CAST and its applicability to robust
scenarios with multiple hypotheses and variables.
This research used a qualitative case study research methodology because even
though the incident revolves around the decision making of the frontline operators, it had
to be considered within context of the entire aviation system and the different entities and
departments in play. The CAST investigation was conducted in a sequence of preprescribed steps as outlined in the CAST Handbook by Dr. Leveson (2019). The analysis
was initiated by collecting all basic data on the incident and establishing the different
systems, hazards and the safety constraints corresponding to each hazard that were in
place. This data was then used by the researcher to model and map the safety control
structure in the aviation industry that was broken down into three different control
structures: Air Traffic Control, Airline Safety, and Airport Safety Control Structures.
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The study also established the sequence of the events that led to the incident. The
loss in the physical controls and the reasons behind why the loss occurred was
determined and analyzed. The physical controls examined included the Airport Surface
Surveillance Capability (ASSC), the facilities the incident aircraft were not equipped with
including Enhanced Ground Proximity and Warning Systems (EGPWS), Runway
Awareness and Advisory Systems (RAAS) and Smart Landing and airfield lighting.
Following this, the analysis progressed further to explore the ramifications of any
dynamics in the safety control structure that influenced the events of the incident, these
include: Industry and Organizational Safety Culture, Crew Resource Management and
Fatigue. As per the final step of CAST, the researcher produced a set of recommendations
that would improve the safety control structures in the industry based on the findings of
the CAST analysis.
5.2 Summary of the Findings
Based on the findings of the CAST analysis, the primary contributing factors was:
the AC759 incident occurred due to the limited capabilities of the Airport Surface
Surveillance Systems and Air Canada’s ineffectiveness at equipping the A320-200 fleet
with the Runway Awareness and Advisory Systems (RAAS), Enhanced Ground
Proximity and Warning System and Smart Landing situational awareness facilities.
The systems approach to hazardous events involving runway incursions produced
a range of alternative contributing factors. These contributing factors include:
1. Lack of automation led to incorrect alignment of AC759 with Taxiway C.
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2. Lack of information systems such as RAAS, EGPWS and Smart Landing systems
that left the flight crew uninformed and unaware, as a result they could not take
corrective action.
3. ASSC was limited in detection capabilities and functionality so it could not detect
incorrect alignment or positioning of incoming aircraft on final approach.
4. NOTAMs are not very effective at delivering critical information as they have a
uniform design that blends in with pages and pages of countless information.
5. The airfield lighting layout at the time of the incident presented a misleading
visual of the runways that led to confusion in the incoming flight on final
approach.
5.3 Implications of the Study
This case study has highlighted that cognitive dissonance and expectation bias
play a very influential role in the understanding and actions taken by operators in any
given scenario. During the final approach at SFO, the flight crew of AC759 experienced
cognitive dissonance due to construction on the airport. The unusual lighting
configurations on the airfield at the time of the incident likely led to an obscured view of
the SFO Airfield. The runway closure marker “X” sign for instance, was not clearly
visible due to the clusters of bright white lights left positioned to the left of both Runways
28L and 28R. Although the pilots may have known that Runway 28L was closed, the
obscured visuals on the runway closure marker was not visible enough to indicate so
which would have led to further cognitive dissonance. Moreover, since the lights of
Runway 28L were unlit when it was closed for construction, it also gave rise to the
opportunity for further cognitive dissonance. This is because the four aircraft holding
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short on Taxiway C (parallel to the right of Runway 28R) covered up the centerline lights
of the taxiway and portrayed a straight line of strobing white lights from the aircraft anticollision wing tips, which could have been perceived as the runway lights or ALSF lights
of Runway 28R. All these visual cues ultimately led to the flight crew to likely perceive
that they were on the right approach since Taxiway C looked like it might be Runway
28R, as a result the flight crew of AC759 fell prey to the expectation bias that they were
lined up with the correct runway. Likewise, the ATC controller at the control tower could
only visually verify from the tower what the positioning of AC759 was. Since ATC tower
had an angled view towards the airfield, the controller also faced expectation bias. This is
because the angled positioning of the ATC tower led the controller to simply verify what
he saw with the outcome of what he expected or estimated the positioning of AC759 to
be. Cognitive dissonance can evidently influence the actions that pilots and operators
take, especially when the situation presented is in contrast or conflict with what they
already know as part of their routine.
Situational Awareness is also a core component for the efficacy of actions and
decisions made by controllers and operators during their duties. An operator who is fully
aware of the given circumstances in the environment will be the best equipped to make
the most effective and safe decisions. However, there are limitations to the situational
awareness capabilities of all operators as was observed in this case study analysis. High
workload combined with the effects of the circadian low can deteriorate an operators’
ability to maintain vigilante situational awareness. The Flight crew of AC759 were
already fatigued after they maneuvered through a storm during their state of circadian
low, and the additional out of routine task of manually tuning the ILS also increased their
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workload. Moreover, the A320 was not equipped with any RAAS, EGPWS or Smart
Landing Features which the aircraft had the option to be fitted with. The presence of
these features would have significantly enhanced the situational awareness of the flight
crew and alerted them to their unusual positioning earlier in the approach. This highlights
that operators can only go above and beyond to an extent as they are limited with what
they see and know, and as a result the operators can only function as well as the systems
and features available to them.
This qualitative case study analysis has proved that CAST is robust and capable
enough to analyze incidents, or near accidents and extrapolate weaknesses from the
existing safety control structure of any given industry.

5.4 CAST Safety Control Structures and Recommendations
The basis of the CAST analysis was development of the three safety control
structures depicting the hierarchical systems that were in place at the time of the AC759
incident. These safety control structures were: Air Traffic Control, Airline, and Airport.
The overall aviation safety control structure was segregated into these three structures to
avoid overlap with common components, and to simplify understanding of the
interactions between common components in each system. Common components
included: Aircraft, Pilots and NOTAM.
Furthermore, the recommendations stemming from the CAST analysis are
provided below for ease of reference.
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Recommendation 1: Build a software program that reads NOTAMs and alerts
flight crew to critical information and action needed/recommended. NOTAMs can be
long enough to cover several pages, some of it being weather related data. A method or
software to pick out critical information from NOTAMs would be a helpful tool that
would automate the manual tasks of pilots industry wide. This could address the
limitations and the problem of long, uniform looking NOTAMs for pages on end that
may be hard to retain to memory. This could also enhance last minute update
communication systems with flight crew.
Recommendation 2: Inform captains of training records/observations about first
officers who have difficulty maintaining situational awareness or are easily distracted.
Although there is an ethical and legal barrier to disclosure of private information,
information like this may be critical to the captain to maintain effective CRM and
navigate a safe flight. The enhancement it would bring to situational awareness, safety
and CRM would compensate for any likely errors or missteps.
Recommendation 3: Expand ASSC capabilities to incorporate graphical
depictions of aircraft and vehicles around taxiways that may pose a risk on the airfield.
The air traffic controller was unaware of the situation of AC759 because the systems that
were there to aid him were also limited by their operational capabilities and functional
restrictions. For runways with full-length parallel taxiways, this would provide a
significant safety enhancement by improving the controller’s situational awareness and in
full knowledge of imminent hazardous situations.
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Recommendation 4: Maintain pilots’ skills by practicing manual tasks that are
normally out of routine. For example, skills can be enhanced by integrating appropriate
procedures into recurrent training programs for pilots. Airlines can add a practice task of
manually tuning the ILS to ensure Pilots are in practice and in routine for manually
tuning the ILS. Since SFO Airport requires the use of the quiet visual approach,
providing an additional briefing or advisory or software aid to support aircraft for manual
tuning of ILS would be helpful to the flight crew in order to mitigate hazardous
conditions especially during maintenance and construction work. These measures would
reduce the likelihood of flight crew forgetting to manually tune the ILS when needed and
thereby would enhance safety.
Recommendation 5: Improve runway closure marking guidelines to clearly
indicate a runway is for construction, especially during nighttime hours.
Recommendation 6: Construction lighting and other unnecessarily distracting
lighting on the airfield should be configured to be dimmer than the runway closure
marker and runway lights. This solution allows for a distinction in the lighting levels and
therefore the visual image that the pilots see. This could enhance the situational
awareness of flight crew and prevent confusion. The two clumps of bright light to the left
of both the parallel runways in the AC759 may have diminished the effectiveness of the
runway closure marking to stand out as a sign.
Recommendation 7: Organizations should review and update their policies and
best practices frequently in order to ensure they are up to date with new technology,
findings and services. This especially applies to Air Canada as their policy to not make
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changes to the approach database unless a piece of data was wrong led to the missed
opportunity and benefit of automating the ILS tuning of the aircraft for approach of
Runway 28R. Transport Canada should also especially review and amend their policies at
five year intervals as new studies and findings shed new light on safety concerns and
factors that influence it such as fatigue. In a high risk, complex industry like aviation,
new research and technology is emerging every day that alters the control systems and
structures of the aviation industry. Aviation authorities must keep up to date in order to
alleviate any potential hazards that may arise from newly identified concerns or
technologies.
Recommendation 8: The FAA should consider amending their ruling on ATC
staffing to have two controllers on duty at all times at heavy traffic airports like SFO.
Recommendations 9: Foster an industry-wide initiative to mandate the ILS autotuning capabilities for aircraft approaches. The auto-tuning of ILS by aircraft FMS has
become so common in the industry, that asking a pilot to manually tune it is an out of
routine task that is very critical to the safe navigation of aircraft to the correct destination.
As a result, this would become a risk for a pilot flying in a state of circadian low because
they may forget to manually tune the ILS.
Recommendation 10: SFO airport should reconsider the Quiet Visual Approach
for Runway 28R because the runway is located on the far end of the neighboring
residential zones. Especially during construction work on the airfield, a precision
approach would be a safer buffer with other potential hazards from the construction
around the airfield.
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Recommendation 11: Aviation authorities should regulate or at least advise
commercial airlines to equip their fleet with EGPWS and RAAS. Since pilots face an
intensive duty of safely maneuvering aircraft, equipping aircraft with these features
should be considered essential as they enhance the pilot’s situational awareness. With so
many complicated and unknown external as well as internal factors in play, automated
features such as RAAS will improve the flight crews’ situational awareness and thereby
enhance safety.
Recommendation 12: Develop, and integrate into the industry, a graphical GPS
software that displays the positioning of aircraft on approach and gives aural alerts when
an aircraft is off path. Although this would increase the workload of the ATC controller,
it will vastly enhance the situational awareness of the controllers, and the controllers need
only refer to it when it gives an alert of an incorrectly aligned aircraft.
Recommendation 13: NOTAMs bearing last minute changes in runway arrival
configuration should be highlighted in an eye-catching visual format such as a bold,
underlined, brightly colored, or enlarged text. Last minute changes in runway arrival
configuration can lead to a possible opportunity for the flight crew to miss mentally
registering critical new information.
Recommendation 14: ATC controllers should issue cautionary advisories to
aircraft on arrival to exercise caution in observation and operation when construction is
being conducted on an airport’s airfield.
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5.5 Recommendations for Future Research
This research was limited to the Air Canada Flight 759 incident that took place on
July 7, 2017 at San Francisco International Airport. Future research could assess the risks
linked with manually tuning an ILS across a few different incidents with the same issue
of the flight crew forgetting to manually tune an ILS. Moreover, the information retrieved
and extracted for conducting the study was limited to what was available from sources,
such as accident reports and accident data dockets released by the National
Transportation Safety Board. Future research may encompass alternate data sources such
as other responsible actors in the system, for example, interviews with the flight dispatch
or Air Canada Safety Management Systems (SMS) personnel.
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